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New York Court of Appeal Used Equitable Principle to Stop “Predator” Spouse from Benefiting from Her Wrongdoing: Campbell v. Thomas

We recently blogged about a New York “predatory marriage” case, In the Matter of Berk,1 where the Court of Appeal relied on the equitable principle that ‘no one should profit from his or her wrongdoing’ to overturn a lower court’s decision which awarded the “predator” by strictly applying estates and trust legislation (the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law,2 the “EPTL”). The decision Campbell v. Thomas3 was released at the same time as In the Matter of Berk and it also examined the use of an equitable remedy in the context of a predatory marriage situation.

Facts

In 2000, a 72 year old widower was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer and dementia. He was primarily cared for by his daughter, however, when she went on vacation for a week in March 2001, he was left in the care of a woman he had known for many years. The temporary caregiver, who was 20 years his junior, took this opportunity to marry the widower without his family’s knowledge. She also quickly made certain of the widower’s bank accounts joint; transferred approximately $150,000.00 into her name; and made herself the sole beneficiary of his retirement pension of $147,000.00 (originally there were multiple beneficiaries of the pension, including the temporary caregiver and his children).

The widower passed away in August of 2001. The children of the deceased brought a lawsuit in November 2001 seeking a declaration that the marriage (and the transfer of the money in the bank accounts and change of beneficiary designation) was null and void as their father lacked capacity. They later amended their claim to allege undue influence, conversion and fraud.

The “wife” defended the marriage, arguing that she had been in a relationship with the deceased for over 25 years and that he had proposed to her many times before she accepted (in 1979, 1981, 1985 and 2001).

The motion court denied a summary judgment motion brought by the plaintiffs as it concluded there was a triable issue. The appellate court disagreed and found that the plaintiffs met their prima facie case by presenting evidence that the widower was “incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding”.4 The appellate court sent the case back to the motion court for a judgement declaring that the marriage was null and void (among other things). The motion court subsequently issued an order declaring that the wife had “no legal rights” and could “claim no legal interest as a spouse”.5 The wife’s motion to modify or vacate this order was dismissed. She appealed.

Appellate Court

Pursuant to the EPTL, a surviving spouse has a right of election against the deceased spouse’s estate (for $50,000 or 1/3 of the estate, whichever is more) unless it is established that 1) a decree or judgment of divorce, annulment or nullity was in effect at the time of death, or 2) the marriage was void because of incest or bigamy.

At the Court of Appeal the ‘wife’ argued that according to the EPTL, she was a “surviving spouse”. The marriage was not declared by a Court to be null and void until after the widower passed away. Therefore, on the date that he died she was his spouse and entitled to her share of his estate.

Equity to the Rescue

The Court of Appeal observed that the “inescapably plain” language of the statute is incongruous with the fact that an annulment would normally render the marriage void ab initio (i.e. the marriage would never have existed; therefore the deceased had no spouse on the day he died). The legislature “attached to annulled marriages, for certain purposes, the same significance that a valid marriage would have”.6 This would produce a just result in some circumstances (for example where a surviving spouse was unaware of the deceased’s lack of capacity and free of any wrongdoing, therefore eligible for the elective share) but a harsh result in others (where a predator knowingly took advantage of an incapacitated individual).

The Court chose not to apply a strict interpretation of the statute. Instead, being a court of equity as well as law, it granted relief consistent with the equitable principle that “no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity. . .”7 Pursuant to this principle, the wrongdoer is deemed to have forfeited the benefit that would flow from his or her wrongdoing, in this case the elective share. This is a fundamental equitable principle which addresses a question of broad public policy.  The Court found that while this principle is often used to stop a murderer from gaining a share of an estate it should not be limited to such extreme situations.

In addressing the wording of the statute, the Court commented that:

The literal terms of a statute should not be rigidly applied if to do so ‘would be to ordain the statute as an instrument for the protection of fraud. . .Mechanically applying [the legislation] to honor the right of election of a surviving spouse whose very status as a spouse was procured through overreaching or undue influence would ‘seemingly invite a plethora of surreptitious ‘deathbed marriages’ as a means of obtaining one third of a decedent’s estate immune from challenge’.8

In applying the equitable principle, the Court turned to evidence showing that the ‘wife’ was aware of the deceased’s lack of capacity to marry and that she knew he had very little time to live. With this knowledge, she purposely waited until the deceased’s primary caregiver was away on vacation to marry him without informing anyone. By this conduct, the Court found that she “forfeited her rights that would flow from the marital relationship, including the statutory right she would otherwise have to an elective share of [the deceased’s estate].”9

Ultimately the Court concluded that the equitable doctrine did not “displace legislative authority, but complement[ed] it.” The decision “did not reflect an effort to avoid a result intended by the Legislature. Rather, . . .it is clear to us that the Legislature did not contemplate the circumstances presented by this case when it enacted EPTL. . .”10

Conclusion

The temporary caregiver abused a position of trust. Under such circumstances the New York Court concluded that equity should intervene to prevent unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer. Not only will the application of this equitable principle protect vulnerable incapacitated individuals it also protects the integrity of the courts.


1. 29 Misc. 3d 691, 864 N.Y.S. 2d 710, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28247 (cited as 20 Misc.3d 691, 864 N.Y.S. 2d 710)(Berk).

2. §5-1.1-A.

3. 897 NYS2d 460 (2010), 73 AD3d 103 (2010)(Campbell).

4. Campbell at p.5.

5. Ibid.

6. Campbell at p.8.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Campbell at p.9.

10. Campbell at p.10.

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