On October 26, 2020, I co-chaired an Ontario Bar Association program on Section 3 Counsel appointed under the Substitute Decisions Act (the “SDA”), with Alexander Procope. The program was a full-day event which addressed various aspects of the role of section 3 counsel appointed under the SDA.
STEP members will inevitably have met circumstances within their various practice areas, where the capacity of the client is “at issue” within their retainer. The OBA program in the overview addressed the following:
- When capacity is in issue in a proceeding;
- Navigating client management and professionalism challenges;
- How to present the allegedly incapable client’s position;
- The What, When, Who, Why and How of capacity assessments;
- What is the role of the Public Guardian and Trustee;
- Avoiding negligence claims and personal costs claims;
- Bringing a Habeas Corpus application;
- Exploring the role of amicus curiae; and
- Concluding your role as section 3 counsel.
I recommend the OBA materials to you in the event that you have the occasion to consider a section 3 counsel appointment. For those readers unfamiliar with the provisions under the SDA, section 3 of the SDA provides that in cases where an individual whose capacity is in issue in proceedings under this legislation does not have counsel, the Ontario Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT”) may be directed by the court to arrange legal representation for that person. The unedited provision reads as follows:
Counsel for person whose capacity is in issue
3 (1) If the capacity of a person who does not have legal representation is in issue in a proceeding under this Act,
(a) the court may direct that the Public Guardian and Trustee arrange for legal representation to be provided for the person; and
(b) the person shall be deemed to have capacity to retain and instruct counsel. 1992, c. 30, s. 3 (1).
Responsibility for legal fees
(2) If legal representation is provided for a person in accordance with clause (1) (a) and no certificate is issued under the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 in connection with the proceeding, the person is responsible for the legal fees. 1992, c. 30, s. 3 (2); 1998, c. 26, s. 108.
Note: On a day to be named by proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor, subsection 3 (2) of the Act is amended by striking out “and no certificate is issued under the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998” and substituting “and the person is not eligible to receive comparable legal aid services under the Legal Aid Services Act, 2020”. (See: 2020, c. 11, Sched. 15, s. 59)
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) affects any right of the person to an assessment of a solicitor’s bill under the Solicitors Act or other review of the legal fees and, if it is determined that the person is incapable of managing property, the assessment or other review may be sought on behalf of the person by,
(a) the person’s guardian of property; or
(b) the person’s attorney under a continuing power of attorney for property.
It is clear from this obvious brief provision, that there is very little guidance for counsel appointed pursuant to section 3 of the SDA (“s.3 counsel”).
Some time ago now, when I co-authored a paper, published in The Advocates’ Quarterly, it was anticipated that the interpretation of the nature and extent of the role of s.3 counsel would expand and evolve over time as more precedent developed at common law. It is expected that the interpretation of certain issues that arise and which are unique to each individual case may be learned over time in what appears to be a consistently expanding role for s. 3 counsel. Indeed, another instructive look at the history of s. 3 counsel, can be learned from the paper more recently authored by Alex Procope. Certain questions ought to be posed from the outset of any s.3 counsel appointment, particularly given more recent case law, including:
- At what stage of the proceedings should the appointment of s.3 counsel be sought?
- Can/should any court relief be granted before s. 3 counsel is appointed; and,
- Are there circumstances where s.3 counsel ought not to be appointed, despite the fact that capacity is in issue?
At what stage of the proceedings should a s.3 appointment order be sought?
In many circumstances, the answer to the question is – it depends.
In any proceedings commenced under the SDA, the individual subject matter whose capacity is in issue in the proceeding, is entitled to counsel, whether counsel retained of one’s own initiative, retained with the assistance of another, or, s.3 counsel when and where appropriate.
The determination of the appropriateness of s.3 counsel may not be obvious in that the individual, possibly has not responded to having been served with the notice of application, in which case, it may be appropriate that s.3 counsel be appointed to ascertain the instructions of the individual subject matter of the proceedings, if any, and to assist with the response to the court proceeding given the very serious circumstances which can result in capacity proceedings. If we accept for the moment, that circumstances of the appointment are dependent on unique facts, we should always endeavor to canvas whether or not a s. 3 appointment is advisable.
In most instances, the circumstances of the individual subject matter are largely unknown at the outset of a proceeding.
In some situations, the individual may retain counsel, and, yet later in the proceedings, that counsel retained, may seek a s. 3 appointment of either themselves, or another lawyer.
Can/should any relief be granted before s. 3 counsel is appointed?
Following on from the contemplation of the stage of the proceeding wherein an appointment ought to be made or considered, is the question of whether in a proceeding already commenced, it is appropriate to ask the court to grant relief before counsel is appointed for the individual subject matter of the proceeding, including whether such appointment is appropriate.
The answer to this question also, in large measure, depends on the unique circumstances of the proceeding.
If it is contemplated from the outset that s.3 counsel be appointed either at the first hearing, or, at a subsequent hearing because the relief has been specifically requested in the application itself, then best practices might be to have no relief ordered unless and until the s.3 appointment is in place, since there is serious risk that the individual may be unduly restricted, limited, or prejudiced by an initial court order having been granted without the benefit of legal advice is important to avoid.
Of course, it is possible to think of circumstances where certain orders ought to issue even if only on an interim basis, particularly where the individual is at immediate risk, whether in respect of care, property management, or both.
If we were to use the example of relief often typically sought in a guardianship application, for example, which would include an order for a capacity assessment, or an order for a declaration of incapacity, it is hoped that the obvious answer to whether or not an order should issue is, no, because the individual is entitled to rights advice, to refuse an assessment, and to receive legal advice on this serious question affecting their rights and autonomy.
Are there circumstances where s.3 counsel ought not to be appointed, despite the fact that capacity is in issue?
Considering the purposes of s.3 of the SDA, which are primarily to provide legislative protection for vulnerable individuals whose capacity is at issue during the course of legal proceeding, the importance of the court being permitted to make a s.3 counsel appointment, cannot be underscored enough, since it is intended to give vulnerable parties an autonomous voice in litigation that may adversely impact their interests.
Importantly, s.3 of the SDA does not make the appointment of legal representation mandatory, and the court must therefore assess the specific facts and legal issues in contention when deciding whether such appointment is appropriate.
Notably, legal representation may be ordered even where there has already been a capacity assessment, or a court order declaring a person to be incapable with respect to making a particular decision.
The role of s.3 counsel, in part, is to provide legal advice and to advance the interests of the individual whose capacity is in issue, and in certain circumstances, to convey instructions, wishes and interests to the court.
Legal representation is an important safeguard to protect the dignity, privacy, and legal rights of persons alleged to be incapable.
In Kwok, the court held that the appointment of legal representation under s.3 was not appropriate, nor necessary. The PGT sought the appointment of s.3 counsel in respect of a person, who had been declared incapable of managing property and person, and in circumstances where the son had been originally appointed his guardian, but a change in guardian was sought. The PGT argued that s.3 counsel should be appointed since the subject matter’s condition might have improved, and since a more limited guardianship appointment might be appropriate. The appointment was opposed on the basis of the potential cost consequences. The court held in this case, that the appointment of s.3 counsel was not in the incapable person’s best interests and was a waste of resources. In so finding, the court considered the following:
- The lack of dispute as to who should act as the incapable person’s guardian;
- The lack of an evidentiary basis to question the continued validity of the assessment declaring the person incapable;
- The evidence of a doctor that the person’s condition had not improved;
- The court judgment declaring the person incapable, and maintenance of that status quo; and,
- The incapable person’s own stated wishes in support of the appointment of his wife as guardian.
Historically, there have been several cases where an individual had been assessed as incapable, yet, the court either decided to exercise its discretion and appoint s.3 counsel, or, even in one case, not to terminate the appointment of s.3 counsel, stating that s.3 counsel had a role to convey to the court and to put forward the views and wishes of an incapable adult.
Notwithstanding historical treatment, recent case law from 2018 onwards seems to indicate the shaping of a more measured approach to the appointment. In summary, these cases seem to stem from circumstances where the court has determined that the appointment of s.3 counsel is inappropriate on the facts before it. The scrutiny and lack of appropriateness of the appointment were determined on the unique situation before the court with the results as follows: where there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the individual whose capacity is in issue, is incapable of entering into a solicitor/client relationship; where the appointment is considered to be a waste of resources and expense; where the PGT is the statutory guardian of an incapable person, thus, the appointment would place the PGT in a potential position of conflict, no appointment was made. The analysis of each of these outcomes was case specific.
In Miziolek v Miziolek, the court was tasked with determining whether it was appropriate in the circumstances to order that counsel be appointed for a vulnerable adult under s.3 of the SDA.
It was accepted that the woman was incapable of managing property, making personal care decisions, providing counsel with realistic insight into her wishes, and instructing counsel in any meaningful manner. Two daughters were fighting over the powers of attorney, both for property and personal care that had been granted to one daughter, citing reasons of invalidity and breach of fiduciary duty. The court ultimately held that in light of the factual findings regarding capacity, that there was no beneficial role that s.3 counsel could advance. The court held that while an assessment of incapacity does not foreclose the appointment of s.3 counsel, and, indeed such counsel may constitute a means by which the perspective and feelings of an incapable person may be conveyed to the court, given the discreet issues at play, the appointment of s.3 counsel would be ineffective, and would be a waste of resources and an expense which would not assist in advancing or resolving the litigation.
The applicant in this case argued that there is an important role for s.3 counsel even where an incapable person is not capable of giving instructions or stating wishes. That role is to present the client’s wishes whether from the client or other sources and, even where there are no instructions, the role of counsel is to ensure that legal, procedural and evidentiary requirements are met in the proceeding.
Justice Goodman noted the potential contradiction s.3 counsel might encounter: tasked with acting for an allegedly incapable client who is “deemed” to have the capacity, yet, also not acting if the person’s capacity to give instructions is lacking. In resolving the apparent contradiction, and arriving at its decision that s.3 counsel not be appointed in this case, the court found that there were more than reasonable grounds to believe that the mother is incapable of entering into a solicitor/client relationship, which she would have to pay and contract for, and, that given the medical report of Dr. Sadavoy, concluded it to be probable that doing so would cost the mother significant emotional distress, if forced into dealing with an unfamiliar counsel.
Importantly, Miziolek reinforced the view that s.3 of the SDA is to be applied by the court in a flexible and permissive manner.
In Sylvester v Britton, the court refused to terminate the appointment of s.3 counsel and Justice Raikes provided reasons as to why this case is distinguishable from Miziolek. The court had to consider a motion brought by the applicant calling into to question the capacity of the mother to instruct counsel arranged for by the PGT under a court order, as well as, the removal of s.3 counsel since the person was deemed incapable of providing instructions.
The applicant brought an application seeking to be appointed as guardian of property and the person for her mother, Marjorie. Marjorie had previously appointed 2 of her sons as her attorneys for both property and personal care.
On consent of all parties, the PGT arranged to have a lawyer act for Marjorie on the application in accordance with s.3 of the SDA. The court deemed Marjorie to have the capacity to give instructions.
The applicant contested the presumption of capacity and brought a motion seeking, a declaration that the mother is incapable of managing her person and property, a declaration that the mother was not capable of instructing counsel, an order for the removal of s.3 counsel, and an order that she undergo a comprehensive assessment, including, but not limited to, her capacity to manage her property, her person, and to instruct counsel. In 2015, Marjorie was assessed by a capacity assessor with the finding that she was incapable of managing her property and her person. In 2016, Marjorie was assessed again, this time to determine if she had the requisite capacity to make decisions with respect to admission to a long-term care facility. It was determined that she did not have the requisite capacity, and her sons acting on her behalf pursuant to the power of attorney documents were the substitute decision makers.
Based on the evidence and the assessment reports, the court determined that Marjorie was incapable of making decisions related to her property and her person. In respect of whether she had the capacity to instruct counsel, the court reviewed the challenges and limitations that s.3 counsel encounters from the deemed capacity provisions, together with the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the legal and legislative framework.
Justice Raikes provided a list of the duties of s.3 counsel:
- seek instructions from Marjorie and act on those instructions;
- keep confidential all communications with Marjorie and all information that he obtains from her or on her behalf;
- diligently and ethically advance her interests in accordance with her instructions;
- ensure that legal, procedural and evidentiary requirements are tested;
- make Marjorie’s position or wishes known to the court; and,
- if Marjorie lacks capacity to provide instructions at any point in the litigation, promptly take steps for the appointment of a litigation guardian.
The applicant took the position that a finding of incapacity to manage property and the person was sufficient to establish a lack of capacity to instruct counsel, since it requires a higher level of understanding of financial legal issues. Notably, I am of the view that higher or lower levels of understanding are respectfully, not an appropriate analysis, but rather the appropriate analysis is demonstrated by applying the determining standards or criteria to the requisite decision or task to be assessed. That said however, Justice Raikes concluded that the fact that the mother was suffering from dementia, did not necessarily preclude her from instructing her legal counsel and making her wishes known. The court stated:
I do not agree that because there has been a finding of incapacity to manage property and finances, a party is necessarily incapable of providing instructions to counsel on all matters in issue in litigation. A person may be capable for one task yet incapable for another. The nature of the issues in the litigation will vary in complexity. A person with dementia may have very strong views as to where he or she wishes to live and which of his or her children or family members he or she wants to make decisions for them. Such determinations are based on a lifetime of experience and interactions which may be unaffected by the disease.
Dementia is an insidious and terrible disease. It does not, however, follow a uniform timetable or pattern for every person. In my view, it is inappropriate to apply a blanket rule that if a person is incapable of managing their property and finances, they are incapable of instructing counsel regardless of the nature of the issue. The determination of capacity to instruct is best made by counsel cognizant of the matters in issue and his or her responsibilities to the client and court.
Another important consideration that Justice Raikes addressed, was an evidentiary one. Justice Raikes stated that requiring s.3 counsel to provide evidence to explain why counsel is of the opinion that Marjorie had the capacity to instruct him, would intrude upon his duty of confidentiality to his client and the solicitor/client privilege that attaches to such communications. A court should only intrude on that determination by counsel with great reluctance and where evidence demonstrates a strong likelihood that counsel has strayed from his obligations to the party and the integrity of the court process. This is in contrast notably to the position taken by Justice Hoy (as she then was) in Salzman v Salzman, where the court ruled that the evidence of the solicitor/client meeting could be admitted on the basis that it was relevant to the issue of capacity. This decision was not appealed, had it been, I believe the outcome may well have been different. The applicant relied on the decision of Goodman J., in Miziolek, where the application to appoint s.3 counsel was dismissed. Yet, notably, Justice Raikes stated that the cases are distinguishable as follows:
- the issue in Miziolek concerned whether s.3 counsel should be appointed at all. That determination has already been made in this case; and,
- an assessment was done shortly before the application to appoint s.3 counsel, which clearly and unequivocally indicated that the patient was incapable of providing counsel with realistic insight into her wishes or instructing counsel in any meaningful manner.
Justice Raikes also relied on Righter v Righter to conclude that even if the assessment requested by the applicant was granted, it would not mean that s.3 counsel would cease involvement, that there was still a role for counsel where a party has no capacity.
Ultimately, Justice Raikes was not satisfied with the evidence that Marjorie was incapable of providing instructions to her s.3 counsel and declined the applicant’s motion to remove s.3 counsel.
Revisiting Kwok for a moment, Jiefu was involved in 2 motor vehicle accidents in 2011 causing traumatic brain injury. A capacity assessment was conducted in 2014, revealing that he was incapable of taking care of himself and incapable of managing his property.
In 2015, his son was appointed as his guardian for property and person but later filed an application to be released, and instead asking his mother, who brought her own application to be appointed.
The PGT took the position that s.3 counsel should be appointed. The court considered the arguments of the PGT and the applicants, and noted the following about the role of s.3 counsel:
Section 3 of the SDA does not make the appointment of legal representation mandatory, and the Court must assess the specific facts and legal issues in deciding whether such appointment is appropriate in a specific case
I accept the position of the Public Guardian and Trustee that the appointment of legal representation in such cases is an important safeguard to protect the dignity, privacy and legal rights of persons alleged to be incapable: see Abrams v. Abrams, 2008 CanLII 67884 (ON SC), at paras. 48 and 49.
I also accept the position of the Public Guardian and Trustee that the court has the authority to appoint legal representation even in cases in which there has already been a capacity assessment or a court order declaring a person to be incapable.
The court concluded that the appointment of s.3 counsel would not be in the person’s best interests and would be waste of resources.
In Willis v Burgie, the court held the individual subject matter was incapable of managing her property and personal care and that while the appointment of s.3 counsel would be a good idea, the order unopposed, that it was however premature to make the order because the court did not know how counsel would be paid, and, as such, the appointment was left to a further appointment. This decision also speaks to one of the questions raised at the outset to whether and what orders are appropriate to be made at the outset of an application.
In Dawson v Dawson, the court had to determine whether a litigation guardian should be appointed for the individual subject matter, and whether his wife was an appropriate person to be appointed. The wife sought to be appointed as the litigation guardian for the subject matter, suffering from dementia and found to be incapable of managing his property and of instruction legal counsel. The PGT argued that appointing a litigation guardian was unnecessary and inappropriate and that no litigation guardian should be appointed for a person when the person’s capacity is at issue in a proceeding, particularly in light of the court’s power to direct that counsel be arranged for the person pursuant to s.3 of the SDA.
The wife argued that a litigation guardian is a foregone conclusion, and that rule 7.02(1) does not apply since the subject matter’s current capacity was not in issue. Previously, the subject matter had been assessed and lacked the requisite capacity to manage property, execute a Will, to instruct counsel, and that the rule was not meant to address a situation where the primary issue is not whether a guardian is necessary, but rather who that guardian should be.
The court rejected both parties’ views by explaining the interplay between rule 7.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure and Sec. 3 of the SDA. The judge explained that rule 7.01 gives the court the discretion to determine that an appointment of a litigation guardian is unnecessary or inappropriate, particularly in cases where a party’s capacity is the subject of the proceeding:
 Rule 7.01(1) provides that:
Unless a court orders or a statute provides otherwise, a proceeding shall be commenced, continued or defended on behalf of a party under disability by a litigation guardian.
The opening words of r. 7.01(1) explicitly give the court discretion to deviate from the general rule.
 Rule 7.01(2) furthermore carves out an exception to the general rule requiring a litigation guardian applicable to guardianship proceedings under the Act. It provides that:
Despite subrule (1), an application under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 to appoint a guardian of property or a guardian of the person may be commenced, continued and defended without the appointment of a litigation guardian for the respondent in respect of whom the application is made, unless the court orders otherwise.
 This subrule is again phrased in such a way as to give the court discretion. An application under the Act may be commenced or defended without a litigation guardian being appointed for the person who is the subject of the application. The court may however order that a litigation guardian be appointed.
The judge concluded that pursuant to rule 7.01, the court has the discretion to appoint a litigation guardian for the subject matter, or instead, to decline to do so.
In response to the PGT’s argument, the judge stated that: “guardianship proceedings are often contentious, and, although everyone involved in a guardianship proceeding may have the highest motives, in some cases, a litigation guardian must be appointed to ensure that the interest of the vulnerable party is fully protected.”
Importantly, the court went on to conclude that: “both a litigation guardian and s.3 counsel are responsible for protecting the interests of a vulnerable litigant, but they do so in significantly different ways,” and explained the distinct roles’ as follows:
 This argument is premised on s. 3 counsel having a role that they do not and cannot have. A lawyer appointed to assist a vulnerable person under the Act has the same obligations as any other litigation counsel. Their job is to advise their client of his or her rights and to act on their instructions. If a client has capacity issues, ascertaining their wishes and preferences may be difficult or even impossible. Every lawyer, however, is limited by their understanding of their client’s wishes. If the client’s instructions cannot be ascertained, no lawyer — including a lawyer appointed under s. 3 — can take a position in a proceeding on the assumption that their client would have agreed with it or that it is in their best interest.
 Many lawyers appointed pursuant to s. 3 do commendable work in difficult circumstances. They make a tremendous effort to discern their client’s wishes and often provide the court with very helpful insight as a result. If they are unable to understand what a client wants, however, a s. 3 lawyer cannot make decisions on that person’s behalf.
 By contrast, a litigation guardian stands in the shoes of someone under disability. As the PGT acknowledges in its submissions, a litigation guardian “does not take instructions from [persons under disability] but makes substitute decisions in their best interests”. The powers and duties of a litigation guardian are spelled out in r. 7.05:
7.05 (1) Where a party is under disability, anything that a party in a proceeding is required or authorized to do may be done by the party’s litigation guardian.
(2) A litigation guardian shall diligently attend to the interests of the person under disability and take all steps necessary for the protection of those interests, including the commencement and conduct of a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party claim.
(3) A litigation guardian other than the Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee shall be represented by a lawyer and shall instruct the lawyer in the conduct of the proceeding.
 A litigation guardian therefore does precisely what s. 3 counsel cannot do, that is, make decisions on behalf of a vulnerable person. As stated succinctly by Justice Goodman in rejecting the appointment of s. 3 counsel in Miziolek v. Miziolek, 2018 ONSC 2841, at para. 13:
The role of a Section 3 Counsel is to obtain instructions from the person whose capacity is in issue and absent instructions, counsel is not to act. Section 3 Counsel is not to take on the role of a Litigation Guardian.
 The complementary nature of these two roles is underscored by r. 7.05(3), which requires that a litigation guardian be represented by a lawyer.
The judge in the end, concluded that it may be appropriate in a proceeding like this to appoint a litigation guardian for a vulnerable person.
Notably, in an older decision from 2010, Bon Hillier v Milojevic, on appeal of a finding of the Consent and Capacity Board, where the subject matter was found incapable of managing property, the court held that the appeal was a proceeding under the SDA in which capacity was in issue. The PGT submitted that s.3 should not be used by the court because of the appearance of a possible conflict of interest by the PGT. The court held that although it was a proceeding in which capacity was in issue, s.3 is permissive in nature, giving the court the discretion to request the PGT to arrange legal representation. The court in this instance, held that the argument by the PGT as to why the discretion ought not to be exercised in this instance, was a sound one, and accordingly did not direct the PGT to arrange for legal representation. However, the court did order the appointment of amicus curiae (a similar but not identical appointment) pursuant to the following provision:
Counsel for incapable person
81 (1) If a person who is or may be incapable with respect to a treatment, managing property, admission to a care facility or a personal assistance service is a party to a proceeding before the Board and does not have legal representation,
Note: On a day to be named by proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor, subsection 81 (1) of the Act is amended by striking out “admission to a care facility” in the portion before clause (a) and substituting “admission to or confining in a care facility”. (See: 2017, c. 25, Sched. 5, s. 62)
(a) the Board may direct Legal Aid Ontario to arrange for legal representation to be provided for the person; and
(b) the person shall be deemed to have capacity to retain and instruct counsel.
In this case, the PGT were acting as the statutory guardian of property and Justice Brown took the argument into account in noting that s.3 of the SDA is not directive and again, simply gives the court discretion to order representation:
Nevertheless, section 3(1) of the SDA is permissive in nature, giving the court the discretion to request the PGT to arrange legal representation for Mr. Bon Hillier. An argument advanced by the PGT as to why I should not exercise that discretion in this case strikes me as a sound one. Although it was not a party to Mr. Bon Hillier’s appeal, the PGT submitted that in a sense it stood in a position of conflict of interest because it was acting as his statutory guardian of property by reason of the finding of incapacity that was in issue in the appeal. The PGT argued that Mr. Bon Hillier might lack confidence in any counsel it chose for him since Mr. Bon Hillier has one simple goal on his appeal – to remove the PGT from his life. I think the point made by the PGT is a sensible one, and in the circumstances of this case I conclude that it would not be appropriate for me to direct the PGT to arrange for legal representation of Mr. Bon Hillier.
Consequently, these recent decisions have, when analyzed together, set out several circumstances wherein, it may well be determined by a court, that the appointment of s.3 counsel is not appropriate. These are notable and important considerations to evaluate when confronted with opposition to such an appointment.
It is unclear whether these considerations will have the effect of a more measured approach to future appointments, or, indeed, whether simply as a natural consequence of the expanding considerations and circumstances wherein s.3 counsel are, or are not appointed, remains a work in progress.
 Alexander Procope, Partner, Perez Bryan Procope LLP
 Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Complex Role and Duties of Counsel Appointed Under Section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, The Advocates Quarterly, Vol. 40, 2012, co-authored Kimberly Whaley & Ameena Sultan: https://welpartners.com/resources/WEL_2012_40_Adv_Q_408.pdf.
 The Ongoing History of Section 3 Council: Origins of the Role and a Path Forward: http://pbplawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Procope-The-Ongoing-History-of-Section-3-Counsel.pdf
 Ibid at paras 17-23
Miziolek, supra note 9.
 Sylvester, supra note 12 at para 64
 Sylvester, supra note 12 at paras 71-72
 Saltzman v Saltzman, 2011 CarswellOnt 15786 (ON SC)
 Miziolek, supra note 9.
 Righter v. Righter (Nov. 5, 2008), Doc. 03-20/18 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1
 Kwok, supra note 7.
 Dawson, supra note 22 at paras 13-15.
 Ibid, at paras 28-32
 Milojevic, supra note 27.
This paper is intended for the purposes of providing information only and is to be used only for the purposes of guidance. This paper is not intended to be relied upon as the giving of legal advice and does not purport to be exhaustive.