In Watson v. Lopes,[1] the Ontario Superior Court considered a dependant’s claim for support from the Estate from their spouse, and a related resulting trust claim.
Facts
Watson concerned the Estate of Suzanne Talbot Crawford (the “Deceased”) who died on October 21, 2021. The Deceased was survived by her common law spouse of over 26 years, 71-year-old Kenneth James Watson (the “Applicant”) and an adult daughter from a separate relationship, Kerri-Ann Lopes (the “Respondent”).[2]
Prior to the Deceased’s passing, she cohabited with the Applicant in a property in Ajax, ON (the “Ajax Residence”). The Ajax Residence was owned by the Deceased and the Respondent as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.[3]
The Deceased died with a Last Will and Testament appointing the Respondent as her Estate Trustee and naming her as the sole residuary beneficiary. The Will directed that the Applicant be permitted to live in the Ajax Residence for one year following the Deceased’s death.[4] Outside of the Estate, the Applicant received the balance of a joint bank account held with the Deceased, in the amount of $8,000.[5]
For 10 months after the Deceased’s passing, he resided at the Ajax Residence. Following which he left to move in with his daughter in British Columbia.[6]
On or about June 17, 2022, the Respondent received a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee pursuant to the Deceased’s Will. Following her appointment, the Respondent listed and sold the Ajax Residence with net proceeds of $743,265.09. Apart from the Ajax Residence, the Deceased owned various bank accounts, chattels and life insurance policies with a total value of $284,853.65.[7]
In or around November 2022, the Applicant commenced an application for dependant’s support and sought an order declaring he had a beneficial interest in the Ajax Residence based on resulting trust. In 2020, the Applicant retired from a career working as a driver and loader with the City of Toronto. Since that time, he resided at the Ajax Residence rent-free. Accordingly, he posited that the Deceased provided him with shelter and that he did not have adequate means to support himself.[8]
The application was opposed by the Respondent, who took the position that the Deceased did not make greater provision for the Applicant in her Will because he had the means to support himself, and had been doing so since her passing. In this regard, there was evidence that the Applicant held significant proceeds from a cottage property he owned and had a residence in British Columbia, which had not been disclosed. Moreover, she was entitled to the full proceeds from the sale of the Ajax Residence by rights of survivorship. There was arguably no resulting trust claim given the Deceased did not transfer any interest without consideration.[9]
Legal Issues
The Honourable Justice Dietrich determined there were three key issues to determine on the dependant’s support claim, namely:
- If the Applicant was a “dependant” of the Deceased pursuant to the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”)[10];
- If yes, whether the Deceased made adequate provision for the Applicant’s proper support; and
- If no, what amount of support should the court order, if any.
Was the Applicant a dependant of the Deceased?
Section 57 of the SLRA defines a “dependant” to include the spouse of the deceased, “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death”.[11] In the same section, “spouse” is defined as having the same meaning as in section 29 of the Family Law Act (the “FLA”), [12] and in addition, includes either of two persons who were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated by divorce.[13]
Moreover, section 29 of the FLA includes in the definition of “spouse” two persons who are not married to each other and who have cohabited, continuously, for a period of not less than three years.[14]
There was no dispute that the Applicant was a dependant of the Deceased. It was conceded by the Respondent that the Deceased was providing support to him immediately prior to her death.[15]
Did the Deceased make adequate provision for the Applicant’s proper support?
Section 58(1) of the SLRA provides that:
Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them.[16]
Regarding the amount and duration of support, section 62(1) of the SLRA directs the court to consider all the circumstances of the application, including several factors listed in that section. In Cummings v. Cummings,[17] the Court of Appeal for Ontario described the factors listed in section 62(1) as “a mélange of criteria based not only on needs and means, but also on legal and moral or ethical claims”.[18]
Pursuant to section 72 of the SLRA, for the purposes of Part V, the capital value of certain transactions is deemed to be part of a deceased person’s estate. Such value shall be included as testamentary dispositions as of the date of death of the deceased and shall be deemed to be part of his or her net estate for purposes of ascertaining the value of his or her estate and being available to be charged for payment. Such transactions include any disposition of property made by a deceased whereby property is held at the date of his or her death by the deceased and another as joint tenants.[19]
Resulting Trust claim
The Applicant claimed a beneficial interest in the proceeds from the sale of the Ajax Residence, asserting that he contributed financially to the property, which he argues entitles him an award based a resulting trust. In this regard, the Applicant claimed, without providing corroborated evidence, that he:
- made mortgage payments towards the Ajax Residence between 2003 and 2020
- paid for property taxes, utilities and other expenses for the Ajax Residence, including phone, cable and internet; and
- Contributed towards the significant renovations to the Ajax Residence’s kitchen, bathroom and floors.[20]
Justice Dietrich was mindful of section 13 of the Evidence Act,[21] which provides as follows:
In an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposite or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on his or her own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence.[22]
Based on the evidentiary record, Justice Dietrich found that the Applicant had not met the onus to demonstrate he had a beneficial interest in the Ajax Residence based on his alleged contributions to it. Further still, he adduced zero evidence to support claims that he renovated the property, including any invoices for goods and services.[23]
The Applicant’s need for shelter
The Applicant argued that since Ms. Crawford’s death, his living situation had been precarious, submitting that he was forced to divide his time between living with his daughter in British Columbia and his sister near Sudbury, Ontario, and that he could not afford to pay rent or buy a home in either location. He claimed reliance on the Deceased for shelter during their relationship and asserted that he was a dependant.[24]
Justice Dietrich examined in detail the ownership and nature of a residence at 3726 Haslam Road, Port Alberni, British Columbia (the “BC Residence“). Title documents showed the Applicant as the legal owner of this property, a fact he did not dispute. The Applicant asserted that the BC Residence belonged to his daughter and that he was only on title and the mortgage as a formality to help her qualify for financing. However, the only evidence of the mortgage arrangement showed the Applicant as the sole applicant, with his own name on title, and no signed agreement or documentation supporting a trust arrangement with his daughter was provided. The court found these explanations and supporting evidence lacking credibility, noting inconsistencies between the Applicant’s testimony, his daughter’s testimony and the documents presented.[25]
Her Honour noted that the Applicant’s precise ownership of the property was unclear, as was the disclosure of all his assets during the litigation. On this basis, the court was not persuaded that the Applicant did not have shelter of his own or the means to provide for his own shelter.[26]
Moral Obligation to provide adequate support
The court concluded that, beyond any legal obligation, the Deceased had a moral obligation towards the Applicant due to their 26-year relationship and the significant care the Applicant provided for her, including maintenance of the residence, housekeeping, and personal care, given the Deceased could not perform these tasks herself owing to mental and physical illnesses, which prevented her from working. The Respondent did not dispute this evidence.[27]
The court determined that, based on society’s expectations of what a judicious person would do in the circumstances, the Deceased’s provision to the Applicant was inadequate from a moral standpoint. As a result, the court found it just and equitable to award the Applicant a lump sum of $50,000 on account of the Deceased’s moral obligation to him.[28]
Concluding Comments
Watson underscores the factors and evidentiary considerations a court will consider on a dependant’s support claim. Whereas in this instance the Applicant’s claim to an interest in the Ajax Residence failed for lack of corroboration, the court was minded to award him support considering the Deceased’s moral obligations as a spouse.
—
[1] Watson v. Lopes, 2025 ONSC 5934 (“Watson”).
[2] Watson at paras 1, 3 and 8.
[3] Watson at paras 9 and 10.
[4] Watson at para 14.
[5] Watson at para 15.
[6] Watson at para 16.
[7] Watson at paras 17, 18, and 21.
[8] Watson at para 4.
[9] Watson at paras 33 – 38.
[10] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (the “SLRA”).
[11] SLRA, section 57.
[12] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”).
[13] Watson at para 40.
[14] FLA, section 29.
[15] Watson at para 50.
[16] SLRA, section 58(1).
[17] Cummings v. Cummings, 69 O.R. (3d) 398 (C.A.).
[18] Ibid. at para 34.
[19] SLRA, section 72(1)(d).
[20] Watson at para 63.
[21] Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23.
[22] Ibid. at section 13.
[23] Watson at paras 64, 65 and 70.
[24] Watson at paras 30, 78 – 89.
[25] Watson at paras 90.
[26] Watson at paras 86, and 90.
[27] Watson at paras 95 – 97.
[28] Watson at para 98.
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Written by: Oliver O'Brien
Posted on: November 28, 2025
Categories: Commentary, WEL Newsletter
In Watson v. Lopes,[1] the Ontario Superior Court considered a dependant’s claim for support from the Estate from their spouse, and a related resulting trust claim.
Facts
Watson concerned the Estate of Suzanne Talbot Crawford (the “Deceased”) who died on October 21, 2021. The Deceased was survived by her common law spouse of over 26 years, 71-year-old Kenneth James Watson (the “Applicant”) and an adult daughter from a separate relationship, Kerri-Ann Lopes (the “Respondent”).[2]
Prior to the Deceased’s passing, she cohabited with the Applicant in a property in Ajax, ON (the “Ajax Residence”). The Ajax Residence was owned by the Deceased and the Respondent as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.[3]
The Deceased died with a Last Will and Testament appointing the Respondent as her Estate Trustee and naming her as the sole residuary beneficiary. The Will directed that the Applicant be permitted to live in the Ajax Residence for one year following the Deceased’s death.[4] Outside of the Estate, the Applicant received the balance of a joint bank account held with the Deceased, in the amount of $8,000.[5]
For 10 months after the Deceased’s passing, he resided at the Ajax Residence. Following which he left to move in with his daughter in British Columbia.[6]
On or about June 17, 2022, the Respondent received a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee pursuant to the Deceased’s Will. Following her appointment, the Respondent listed and sold the Ajax Residence with net proceeds of $743,265.09. Apart from the Ajax Residence, the Deceased owned various bank accounts, chattels and life insurance policies with a total value of $284,853.65.[7]
In or around November 2022, the Applicant commenced an application for dependant’s support and sought an order declaring he had a beneficial interest in the Ajax Residence based on resulting trust. In 2020, the Applicant retired from a career working as a driver and loader with the City of Toronto. Since that time, he resided at the Ajax Residence rent-free. Accordingly, he posited that the Deceased provided him with shelter and that he did not have adequate means to support himself.[8]
The application was opposed by the Respondent, who took the position that the Deceased did not make greater provision for the Applicant in her Will because he had the means to support himself, and had been doing so since her passing. In this regard, there was evidence that the Applicant held significant proceeds from a cottage property he owned and had a residence in British Columbia, which had not been disclosed. Moreover, she was entitled to the full proceeds from the sale of the Ajax Residence by rights of survivorship. There was arguably no resulting trust claim given the Deceased did not transfer any interest without consideration.[9]
Legal Issues
The Honourable Justice Dietrich determined there were three key issues to determine on the dependant’s support claim, namely:
Was the Applicant a dependant of the Deceased?
Section 57 of the SLRA defines a “dependant” to include the spouse of the deceased, “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death”.[11] In the same section, “spouse” is defined as having the same meaning as in section 29 of the Family Law Act (the “FLA”), [12] and in addition, includes either of two persons who were married to each other by a marriage that was terminated by divorce.[13]
Moreover, section 29 of the FLA includes in the definition of “spouse” two persons who are not married to each other and who have cohabited, continuously, for a period of not less than three years.[14]
There was no dispute that the Applicant was a dependant of the Deceased. It was conceded by the Respondent that the Deceased was providing support to him immediately prior to her death.[15]
Did the Deceased make adequate provision for the Applicant’s proper support?
Section 58(1) of the SLRA provides that:
Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them.[16]
Regarding the amount and duration of support, section 62(1) of the SLRA directs the court to consider all the circumstances of the application, including several factors listed in that section. In Cummings v. Cummings,[17] the Court of Appeal for Ontario described the factors listed in section 62(1) as “a mélange of criteria based not only on needs and means, but also on legal and moral or ethical claims”.[18]
Pursuant to section 72 of the SLRA, for the purposes of Part V, the capital value of certain transactions is deemed to be part of a deceased person’s estate. Such value shall be included as testamentary dispositions as of the date of death of the deceased and shall be deemed to be part of his or her net estate for purposes of ascertaining the value of his or her estate and being available to be charged for payment. Such transactions include any disposition of property made by a deceased whereby property is held at the date of his or her death by the deceased and another as joint tenants.[19]
Resulting Trust claim
The Applicant claimed a beneficial interest in the proceeds from the sale of the Ajax Residence, asserting that he contributed financially to the property, which he argues entitles him an award based a resulting trust. In this regard, the Applicant claimed, without providing corroborated evidence, that he:
Justice Dietrich was mindful of section 13 of the Evidence Act,[21] which provides as follows:
In an action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposite or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on his or her own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence.[22]
Based on the evidentiary record, Justice Dietrich found that the Applicant had not met the onus to demonstrate he had a beneficial interest in the Ajax Residence based on his alleged contributions to it. Further still, he adduced zero evidence to support claims that he renovated the property, including any invoices for goods and services.[23]
The Applicant’s need for shelter
The Applicant argued that since Ms. Crawford’s death, his living situation had been precarious, submitting that he was forced to divide his time between living with his daughter in British Columbia and his sister near Sudbury, Ontario, and that he could not afford to pay rent or buy a home in either location. He claimed reliance on the Deceased for shelter during their relationship and asserted that he was a dependant.[24]
Justice Dietrich examined in detail the ownership and nature of a residence at 3726 Haslam Road, Port Alberni, British Columbia (the “BC Residence“). Title documents showed the Applicant as the legal owner of this property, a fact he did not dispute. The Applicant asserted that the BC Residence belonged to his daughter and that he was only on title and the mortgage as a formality to help her qualify for financing. However, the only evidence of the mortgage arrangement showed the Applicant as the sole applicant, with his own name on title, and no signed agreement or documentation supporting a trust arrangement with his daughter was provided. The court found these explanations and supporting evidence lacking credibility, noting inconsistencies between the Applicant’s testimony, his daughter’s testimony and the documents presented.[25]
Her Honour noted that the Applicant’s precise ownership of the property was unclear, as was the disclosure of all his assets during the litigation. On this basis, the court was not persuaded that the Applicant did not have shelter of his own or the means to provide for his own shelter.[26]
Moral Obligation to provide adequate support
The court concluded that, beyond any legal obligation, the Deceased had a moral obligation towards the Applicant due to their 26-year relationship and the significant care the Applicant provided for her, including maintenance of the residence, housekeeping, and personal care, given the Deceased could not perform these tasks herself owing to mental and physical illnesses, which prevented her from working. The Respondent did not dispute this evidence.[27]
The court determined that, based on society’s expectations of what a judicious person would do in the circumstances, the Deceased’s provision to the Applicant was inadequate from a moral standpoint. As a result, the court found it just and equitable to award the Applicant a lump sum of $50,000 on account of the Deceased’s moral obligation to him.[28]
Concluding Comments
Watson underscores the factors and evidentiary considerations a court will consider on a dependant’s support claim. Whereas in this instance the Applicant’s claim to an interest in the Ajax Residence failed for lack of corroboration, the court was minded to award him support considering the Deceased’s moral obligations as a spouse.
—
[1] Watson v. Lopes, 2025 ONSC 5934 (“Watson”).
[2] Watson at paras 1, 3 and 8.
[3] Watson at paras 9 and 10.
[4] Watson at para 14.
[5] Watson at para 15.
[6] Watson at para 16.
[7] Watson at paras 17, 18, and 21.
[8] Watson at para 4.
[9] Watson at paras 33 – 38.
[10] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (the “SLRA”).
[11] SLRA, section 57.
[12] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”).
[13] Watson at para 40.
[14] FLA, section 29.
[15] Watson at para 50.
[16] SLRA, section 58(1).
[17] Cummings v. Cummings, 69 O.R. (3d) 398 (C.A.).
[18] Ibid. at para 34.
[19] SLRA, section 72(1)(d).
[20] Watson at para 63.
[21] Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23.
[22] Ibid. at section 13.
[23] Watson at paras 64, 65 and 70.
[24] Watson at paras 30, 78 – 89.
[25] Watson at paras 90.
[26] Watson at paras 86, and 90.
[27] Watson at paras 95 – 97.
[28] Watson at para 98.
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