Can an ex-spouse still qualify as a “spouse” for dependant support after divorce? If so, does a prior support order survive the payor’s death? This case walks through the Succession Law Reform Act’s[1] extended definition of spouse, the limits of binding support obligations on an estate, and how insolvency and competing dependants can ultimately defeat an otherwise valid dependant support claim.
Background
Mark Sebnac (“Mark”) died intestate on August 27, 2023.[2] At the time of his death, Mark was married to Floribet Fallas Mora (“Floribet”).[3] Floribet applied and was granted a certificate of appointment of estate trustee without a will.[4]
The Application before the Court was brought by Mark’s previous spouse, Joanne Sebnac (“Joanne”), who has brought a claim for dependant relief pursuant to Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.[5] Joanne and Mark were married for 29 years having nine children together.[6]
This Application hearing also saw the disposition of a separate, but related application for the removal of Floribet as Estate Trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, brought by Mark’s children; however, this blog will focus solely on Joanne’s dependant support claim.
Joanne’s Claim for Dependant Relief
The Court begins by establishing the following legal framework:
Joanne must establish the following:
- she falls within one of the qualifying relationships set out in s. 57 of the SLRA, in this case within the extended definition of “spouse”;
- she is Mark’s dependant, in that he was providing support to her, or was under a legal obligation to provide support to her, immediately before his death (s. 57); and,
- Mark did not make adequate provision for Joanne’s proper support (s. 58(1)).[7]
Section 57 of the SLRA, defines spouse as having the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act.[8] Section 29 of the FLA provides the following definitions:
Definitions
29 In this Part,
“dependant” means a person to whom another has an obligation to provide support under this Part; (“personne à charge”)
“spouse” means a spouse as defined in subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
(b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the parents of a child as set out in section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. (“conjoint”) R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 29; 1999, c. 6, s. 25 (2); 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (4-6); 2009, c. 11, s. 30; 2016, c. 23, s. 47 (1).[9]
The Court observes that section 57 of the SLRA implements an “extended definition of ‘spouse’”, alluding to the fact that the relevant provisions includes, two persons who were married to each other but said marriage was terminated by divorce.[10]
The Court notes that Joanne and Mark’s marriage was terminated by divorce and as such, Joanne is a “spouse” within the extended meaning of Part V of the SLRA, who is therefore entitled to bring a dependant relief claim under the SLRA.[11]
In terms of Mark providing Joanne support the Court found that Mark had a legal obligation to do so pursuant to Minutes of Settlement, dated November 13, 2012, which were implemented by Court Order in the Superior Court of Justice on November 14, 2012.[12] The Court notes that the last support payment was made on August 7, 2023, a few weeks prior to Mark’s death.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Joanne was Mark’s dependant.[13]
Does the Order Bind the Estate
The Court begins with the general proposition that a spousal support obligation under the Divorce Act[14] ends with the death of the payor, unless the order makes the support obligation binding on the estate of the payor.[15]
Relying on Schwartz Estate, the Court concludes that the words “[Mark] will pay [Joanne] $600.00 per month in spousal support indefinitely” does not bind the estate.[16]
In considering whether to make an order for support, given that the Court found Joanne was a dependant and Mark did not make adequate provision for her, the Court cites section 62(1) of the SLRA, which requires the consideration of several factors.
Ultimately, in contemplation of these factors, the Court declines to make an order for support because, the Court recognizes that Mark’s Estate is insolvent.[17] Additionally, the Court considers Floribet’s needs as a dependant, pursuant to section 62(1)(o) of the SLRA.[18]
In considering Floribet’s personal circumstances, the Court concludes that her needs are greater than Joanne’s and declines to make an Order under sections 63(2)(f) and 72(1) of the SLRA, as doing so, would deprive Floribet of adequate provision.[19]
Final Remarks
This decision clarifies that an ex-spouse may still qualify as a “spouse” under the extended definition in Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act and therefore have standing to advance a dependant support claim, even after divorce.
Additionally, however, this case also underscores two critical limits on such claims: first, spousal support obligations under the Divorce Act generally terminate on death unless the order expressly binds the estate; and second, entitlement alone does not guarantee relief. Where an estate is insolvent and there are competing dependants with greater need, the court retains discretion under sections 62, 63, and 72 of the SLRA to refuse support in order to avoid depriving another dependant of adequate provision.
—
[1] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, (“SLRA”).
[2] Sebanc Estate (Re), 2025 ONSC 6894 (CanLII), at para 10, (“Sebnac Estate”).
[3] Ibid., at para 4.
[4] Ibid., at paras 4 and 11.
[5] Ibid., at para 1; SLRA, at part V.
[6] Ibid., at para 8.
[7] Ibid., at para 53.
[8] SLRA, at section 57(1).
[9] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, at section 29.
[10] Sebnac Estate, at para 57.
[11] Ibid., at para 59.
[12] Ibid., at paras 60-61.
[13] Ibid., at para 64.
[14] Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).
[15] Sebnac Estate, at para 67; citing Schwartz Estate v. Schwartz (1998), 1998 CanLII 29650 (ON SC), 36 R.F.L. (4th) 110 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 23-27; Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606, 377 D.L.R. (4th) 264, at para 72.
[16] Sebnac Estate, at para 70.
[17] Ibid., at para 90.
[18] Ibid., at para 91.
[19] Ibid., at para 101.
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Written by: Grant Swedak
Posted on: February 11, 2026
Categories: Commentary
Can an ex-spouse still qualify as a “spouse” for dependant support after divorce? If so, does a prior support order survive the payor’s death? This case walks through the Succession Law Reform Act’s[1] extended definition of spouse, the limits of binding support obligations on an estate, and how insolvency and competing dependants can ultimately defeat an otherwise valid dependant support claim.
Background
Mark Sebnac (“Mark”) died intestate on August 27, 2023.[2] At the time of his death, Mark was married to Floribet Fallas Mora (“Floribet”).[3] Floribet applied and was granted a certificate of appointment of estate trustee without a will.[4]
The Application before the Court was brought by Mark’s previous spouse, Joanne Sebnac (“Joanne”), who has brought a claim for dependant relief pursuant to Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.[5] Joanne and Mark were married for 29 years having nine children together.[6]
This Application hearing also saw the disposition of a separate, but related application for the removal of Floribet as Estate Trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, brought by Mark’s children; however, this blog will focus solely on Joanne’s dependant support claim.
Joanne’s Claim for Dependant Relief
The Court begins by establishing the following legal framework:
Joanne must establish the following:
Section 57 of the SLRA, defines spouse as having the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act.[8] Section 29 of the FLA provides the following definitions:
Definitions
29 In this Part,
“dependant” means a person to whom another has an obligation to provide support under this Part; (“personne à charge”)
“spouse” means a spouse as defined in subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited,
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or
(b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the parents of a child as set out in section 4 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. (“conjoint”) R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 29; 1999, c. 6, s. 25 (2); 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (4-6); 2009, c. 11, s. 30; 2016, c. 23, s. 47 (1).[9]
The Court observes that section 57 of the SLRA implements an “extended definition of ‘spouse’”, alluding to the fact that the relevant provisions includes, two persons who were married to each other but said marriage was terminated by divorce.[10]
The Court notes that Joanne and Mark’s marriage was terminated by divorce and as such, Joanne is a “spouse” within the extended meaning of Part V of the SLRA, who is therefore entitled to bring a dependant relief claim under the SLRA.[11]
In terms of Mark providing Joanne support the Court found that Mark had a legal obligation to do so pursuant to Minutes of Settlement, dated November 13, 2012, which were implemented by Court Order in the Superior Court of Justice on November 14, 2012.[12] The Court notes that the last support payment was made on August 7, 2023, a few weeks prior to Mark’s death.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Joanne was Mark’s dependant.[13]
Does the Order Bind the Estate
The Court begins with the general proposition that a spousal support obligation under the Divorce Act[14] ends with the death of the payor, unless the order makes the support obligation binding on the estate of the payor.[15]
Relying on Schwartz Estate, the Court concludes that the words “[Mark] will pay [Joanne] $600.00 per month in spousal support indefinitely” does not bind the estate.[16]
In considering whether to make an order for support, given that the Court found Joanne was a dependant and Mark did not make adequate provision for her, the Court cites section 62(1) of the SLRA, which requires the consideration of several factors.
Ultimately, in contemplation of these factors, the Court declines to make an order for support because, the Court recognizes that Mark’s Estate is insolvent.[17] Additionally, the Court considers Floribet’s needs as a dependant, pursuant to section 62(1)(o) of the SLRA.[18]
In considering Floribet’s personal circumstances, the Court concludes that her needs are greater than Joanne’s and declines to make an Order under sections 63(2)(f) and 72(1) of the SLRA, as doing so, would deprive Floribet of adequate provision.[19]
Final Remarks
This decision clarifies that an ex-spouse may still qualify as a “spouse” under the extended definition in Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act and therefore have standing to advance a dependant support claim, even after divorce.
Additionally, however, this case also underscores two critical limits on such claims: first, spousal support obligations under the Divorce Act generally terminate on death unless the order expressly binds the estate; and second, entitlement alone does not guarantee relief. Where an estate is insolvent and there are competing dependants with greater need, the court retains discretion under sections 62, 63, and 72 of the SLRA to refuse support in order to avoid depriving another dependant of adequate provision.
—
[1] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, (“SLRA”).
[2] Sebanc Estate (Re), 2025 ONSC 6894 (CanLII), at para 10, (“Sebnac Estate”).
[3] Ibid., at para 4.
[4] Ibid., at paras 4 and 11.
[5] Ibid., at para 1; SLRA, at part V.
[6] Ibid., at para 8.
[7] Ibid., at para 53.
[8] SLRA, at section 57(1).
[9] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, at section 29.
[10] Sebnac Estate, at para 57.
[11] Ibid., at para 59.
[12] Ibid., at paras 60-61.
[13] Ibid., at para 64.
[14] Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).
[15] Sebnac Estate, at para 67; citing Schwartz Estate v. Schwartz (1998), 1998 CanLII 29650 (ON SC), 36 R.F.L. (4th) 110 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 23-27; Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606, 377 D.L.R. (4th) 264, at para 72.
[16] Sebnac Estate, at para 70.
[17] Ibid., at para 90.
[18] Ibid., at para 91.
[19] Ibid., at para 101.
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