Can a reconciled partner claim an entire intestate Estate after a prior divorce and less than a year of renewed cohabitation? In a Yukon decision, the Court confronts the meaning of “cohabiting as a couple”, holding that affection and shared living arrangements alone may not establish common-law spousal status.
Background
On August 30, 2022, Sylvie Salomon (“Ms. Salomon”) passed away suddenly without a will, being survived by her partner, Ilka Lasevitz (“Ms. Lasevitz”), and her two adult sons, Izak Baril-Blouin (“Izak”) and Alex Baril-Blouin (“Alex”).[1]
Ms. Salomon and Ms. Lasevitz began living in a common law relationship in about 2013 or 2014 and married in 2015.[2] They separated in 2019 and a divorce was granted on November 14, 2020.[3] At some point, Ms. Salomon and Ms. Lasevitz reconciled their romantic relationship and resumed cohabitation at Ms. Lasevitz’s house at the end of January 2021.[4]
The Application
Sometime after Ms. Salomon’s death, Ms. Lasevitz applied to the Court for a declaration that she was Ms. Salomon’s common law spouse within the meaning of Estate Administration Act,[5] and for an order pursuant to section 74(1) of the EAA.[6] Section 74(1) of the EAA is as follows:
Allowance for common law spouse
74 (1) If an intestate leaves a common law spouse surviving the intestate in the Yukon, the court may that there be retained, allotted, and applied for the support, maintenance, and benefit of the common law spouse so much of the net real or personal estate, or both, of the intestate as the court sees fit, to be payable in the manner the court directs.[7]
In applying to the Court for this order, Ms. Lasevitz contends that she and Ms. Salomon were common law spouses as defined by the EAA at the time of Ms. Salomon’s death in August of 2022,[8] and, therefore, seeks the entirety of Ms. Salomon’s Estate.[9]
Although Izak agrees his mother and Ms. Lasevitz lived in the same house, and that by the summer of 2022 they were living together as a couple,[10] he opposes the application on the grounds that Ms. Lasevitz and his mother were not living together as a couple for twelve months.[11]
Analysis
The Court begins by reviewing the operative effect of section 74 of the EAA, which is not to automatically entitle a surviving common law spouse to inherit from their deceased partner’s Estate, but rather allows for application to receive a share of the Estate.[12]
The Court then turns to the definition of common law spouse as defined within the EAA, which includes:
a person who has cohabited with another person as a couple for at least 12 months immediately before the other person’s death[13]
The Court then considers the meaning of “Cohabitating ‘as a Couple’” and acknowledges that the definition of common law spouse in the EAA has not been judicially considered in the Yukon.[14] To remedy this gap in the caselaw, the Court turns to several other statutes which employ the same definition and operates under the presumption that where the same words are used across statutes, they have the same meaning.[15]
The Court relies on Justice Campbell’s analysis of the definition of common law spouse as considered within the context and definitions of the Fatal Accidents Act.[16] The Court notes that Justice Campbell conducted an extensive analysis of the case law from other jurisdictions that also addressed the definition of “common law spouse”.[17] Notably, Justice Campbell found that no other jurisdiction uses the phrase “as a couple”.
After considering submissions from Ms. Lasevitz counsel, that the parties’ intention are not a relevant factor, the Court finds that the intention to be part of a long-term, committed relationship is an important element of the definition of common law spouse under the EAA, even if cohabiting “as a couple” is broader than other definitions.[18]
In assessing intention, the Court stresses the importance of objective evidence as to the nature of the parties’ relationship and cites a list of factors from Richardson Estate (Re):
(1) SHELTER:
(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?
(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?
(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?
(2) SEXUAL AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR:
(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?
(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
(c) What were their feelings toward each other?
(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?
(e) Did they eat their meals together?
(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?
(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?
(3) SERVICES:
What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:
(a) Preparation of meals,
(b) Washing and mending clothes,
(c) Shopping,
(d) Household maintenance,
(e) Any other domestic services?
(4) SOCIAL:
(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?
(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them towards members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?
(5) SOCIETAL:
What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of them and as a couple?
(6) SUPPORT (ECONOMIC):
(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?[19]
(7) CHILDREN:
What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?
Disposition
In considering the evidence adduced, the Court finds that although the evidence establishes that Ms. Lasevitz and Ms. Salomon had a mutually loving relationship, in which they did things together and did things for each other. In this case, more was required to show they had been “cohabitating as a couple”.[20] Consequently, the Court held that Ms. Lasevitz was unable to demonstrate that, at the time of Ms. Salomon’s death, she and Ms. Lasevitz were common law spouses as contemplated by the EAA.[21]
Final Remarks
This decision clarifies that under the Yukon Estate Administration Act, a surviving common-law partner is not automatically entitled to inherit on an intestacy. Further, to be considered a common-law spouse, one must first establish that they qualify within the meaning of the term as defined under the EAA; specifically, as someone who cohabited with the deceased “as a couple” for at least 12 months immediately before death.
In interpreting this previously unconsidered phrase, the Court held that the analysis extends beyond shared accommodation or affection and requires evidence of a mutual intention to be in a committed, long-term relationship, assessed through objective indicators of the parties’ domestic, social, financial, and personal integration. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that although the parties had reconciled and maintained a loving relationship, the evidence did not establish the requisite period and quality of cohabitation, and the applicant therefore failed to prove common-law spousal status for the purpose of claiming against the intestate estate.
—
[1] Estate Of Salomon (Re), 2025 YKSC 69 (CanLII), at para 1 (“Estate of Salomon”).
[2] Ibid., at para 5.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Estate Administration Act, RSY 2002, c 77 (the “EAA”).
[6] Estate of Salomon, at para 2.
[7] EAA, at section 74(1).
[8] Estate of Salomon, at para 6.
[9] Ibid., at para 2.
[10] Ibid., at para 7.
[11] Ibid., at paras 2 and 7.
[12] Ibid., at para 9.
[13] EAA, at section 1.
[14] Ibid., at para 11
[15] Ibid., at para 11; citing Austin v Goerz, 2007 BCCA at para 41.
[16] Fatal Accidents Act, RSY 2002, c 86.
[17] Ibid., at para 12 and X v 506 All Day Grill, 2019 YKSC 46, at para 80.
[18] Estate of Salomon, at para 15.
[19] Richardson Estate (Re), 2014 BCSC 2162 at para 22.
[20] Estate of Salomon, at para 37.
[21] Ibid.
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Written by: Grant Swedak
Posted on: March 20, 2026
Categories: Commentary
Can a reconciled partner claim an entire intestate Estate after a prior divorce and less than a year of renewed cohabitation? In a Yukon decision, the Court confronts the meaning of “cohabiting as a couple”, holding that affection and shared living arrangements alone may not establish common-law spousal status.
Background
On August 30, 2022, Sylvie Salomon (“Ms. Salomon”) passed away suddenly without a will, being survived by her partner, Ilka Lasevitz (“Ms. Lasevitz”), and her two adult sons, Izak Baril-Blouin (“Izak”) and Alex Baril-Blouin (“Alex”).[1]
Ms. Salomon and Ms. Lasevitz began living in a common law relationship in about 2013 or 2014 and married in 2015.[2] They separated in 2019 and a divorce was granted on November 14, 2020.[3] At some point, Ms. Salomon and Ms. Lasevitz reconciled their romantic relationship and resumed cohabitation at Ms. Lasevitz’s house at the end of January 2021.[4]
The Application
Sometime after Ms. Salomon’s death, Ms. Lasevitz applied to the Court for a declaration that she was Ms. Salomon’s common law spouse within the meaning of Estate Administration Act,[5] and for an order pursuant to section 74(1) of the EAA.[6] Section 74(1) of the EAA is as follows:
Allowance for common law spouse
74 (1) If an intestate leaves a common law spouse surviving the intestate in the Yukon, the court may that there be retained, allotted, and applied for the support, maintenance, and benefit of the common law spouse so much of the net real or personal estate, or both, of the intestate as the court sees fit, to be payable in the manner the court directs.[7]
In applying to the Court for this order, Ms. Lasevitz contends that she and Ms. Salomon were common law spouses as defined by the EAA at the time of Ms. Salomon’s death in August of 2022,[8] and, therefore, seeks the entirety of Ms. Salomon’s Estate.[9]
Although Izak agrees his mother and Ms. Lasevitz lived in the same house, and that by the summer of 2022 they were living together as a couple,[10] he opposes the application on the grounds that Ms. Lasevitz and his mother were not living together as a couple for twelve months.[11]
Analysis
The Court begins by reviewing the operative effect of section 74 of the EAA, which is not to automatically entitle a surviving common law spouse to inherit from their deceased partner’s Estate, but rather allows for application to receive a share of the Estate.[12]
The Court then turns to the definition of common law spouse as defined within the EAA, which includes:
a person who has cohabited with another person as a couple for at least 12 months immediately before the other person’s death[13]
The Court then considers the meaning of “Cohabitating ‘as a Couple’” and acknowledges that the definition of common law spouse in the EAA has not been judicially considered in the Yukon.[14] To remedy this gap in the caselaw, the Court turns to several other statutes which employ the same definition and operates under the presumption that where the same words are used across statutes, they have the same meaning.[15]
The Court relies on Justice Campbell’s analysis of the definition of common law spouse as considered within the context and definitions of the Fatal Accidents Act.[16] The Court notes that Justice Campbell conducted an extensive analysis of the case law from other jurisdictions that also addressed the definition of “common law spouse”.[17] Notably, Justice Campbell found that no other jurisdiction uses the phrase “as a couple”.
After considering submissions from Ms. Lasevitz counsel, that the parties’ intention are not a relevant factor, the Court finds that the intention to be part of a long-term, committed relationship is an important element of the definition of common law spouse under the EAA, even if cohabiting “as a couple” is broader than other definitions.[18]
In assessing intention, the Court stresses the importance of objective evidence as to the nature of the parties’ relationship and cites a list of factors from Richardson Estate (Re):
(1) SHELTER:
(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?
(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?
(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?
(2) SEXUAL AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR:
(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?
(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
(c) What were their feelings toward each other?
(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?
(e) Did they eat their meals together?
(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?
(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?
(3) SERVICES:
What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:
(a) Preparation of meals,
(b) Washing and mending clothes,
(c) Shopping,
(d) Household maintenance,
(e) Any other domestic services?
(4) SOCIAL:
(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?
(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them towards members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?
(5) SOCIETAL:
What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of them and as a couple?
(6) SUPPORT (ECONOMIC):
(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?[19]
(7) CHILDREN:
What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?
Disposition
In considering the evidence adduced, the Court finds that although the evidence establishes that Ms. Lasevitz and Ms. Salomon had a mutually loving relationship, in which they did things together and did things for each other. In this case, more was required to show they had been “cohabitating as a couple”.[20] Consequently, the Court held that Ms. Lasevitz was unable to demonstrate that, at the time of Ms. Salomon’s death, she and Ms. Lasevitz were common law spouses as contemplated by the EAA.[21]
Final Remarks
This decision clarifies that under the Yukon Estate Administration Act, a surviving common-law partner is not automatically entitled to inherit on an intestacy. Further, to be considered a common-law spouse, one must first establish that they qualify within the meaning of the term as defined under the EAA; specifically, as someone who cohabited with the deceased “as a couple” for at least 12 months immediately before death.
In interpreting this previously unconsidered phrase, the Court held that the analysis extends beyond shared accommodation or affection and requires evidence of a mutual intention to be in a committed, long-term relationship, assessed through objective indicators of the parties’ domestic, social, financial, and personal integration. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that although the parties had reconciled and maintained a loving relationship, the evidence did not establish the requisite period and quality of cohabitation, and the applicant therefore failed to prove common-law spousal status for the purpose of claiming against the intestate estate.
—
[1] Estate Of Salomon (Re), 2025 YKSC 69 (CanLII), at para 1 (“Estate of Salomon”).
[2] Ibid., at para 5.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Estate Administration Act, RSY 2002, c 77 (the “EAA”).
[6] Estate of Salomon, at para 2.
[7] EAA, at section 74(1).
[8] Estate of Salomon, at para 6.
[9] Ibid., at para 2.
[10] Ibid., at para 7.
[11] Ibid., at paras 2 and 7.
[12] Ibid., at para 9.
[13] EAA, at section 1.
[14] Ibid., at para 11
[15] Ibid., at para 11; citing Austin v Goerz, 2007 BCCA at para 41.
[16] Fatal Accidents Act, RSY 2002, c 86.
[17] Ibid., at para 12 and X v 506 All Day Grill, 2019 YKSC 46, at para 80.
[18] Estate of Salomon, at para 15.
[19] Richardson Estate (Re), 2014 BCSC 2162 at para 22.
[20] Estate of Salomon, at para 37.
[21] Ibid.
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