Enforcing a Court-Ordered Sale in the Face of Non-Cooperation: Duong v. Nguyen
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Duong v. Nguyen, , 2026 ONSC 1484[1], offers a practical and instructive example of how the Court will use its procedural tools – specifically, a reference – to ensure that a real estate transaction proceeds where one party refuses to cooperate.
More broadly, the case illustrates the Court’s willingness to intervene decisively in property disputes between former spouses or co-owners, particularly where delay or obstruction risks financial prejudice.
What Is a “Reference”?
At the outset, the Court provides a helpful reminder of “references” under Rules 54 and 55 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] A reference allows discrete issues to be determined efficiently outside of a full trial.
References are available in family law proceedings by virtue of Rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules, which permits the Court to proceed by analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure where the Family Law Rules do not adequately address a matter.
Here, the reference was triggered by a prior order requiring the sale of a jointly owned property, with disputes about implementation and distribution left to be determined later.[3]
Background
The parties jointly owned a home as tenants in common, with unequal interests[4]:
- Respondent: 80%
- Applicant: 20%
Following their separation, the Court ordered the property sold and set conditions governing the sale and distribution of proceeds.[5]
Although the property was successfully sold, the transaction was jeopardized when the Applicant failed to[6]:
- sign closing documents,
- respond to communications, and
- meaningfully participate in the sale process.
This non-cooperation prompted the Respondent to seek relief through a reference on an urgent basis, heard the day before the real estate transaction was to close.
Issues
This reference required the Court to determine two core issues arising from the implementation of the prior sale order:
- The conduct of the applicant and whether it justified granting the respondent sole signing authority to complete the sale; and
- The distribution of the proceeds of sale, including the proper allocation of closing costs, mortgage payments, insurance premiums, and cost awards.
Analysis
Conduct of the Applicant
The Court had little difficulty concluding that the applicant’s conduct warranted intervention.
The evidentiary record established that the applicant failed to meaningfully participate in the sale process. He did not sign the necessary closing documents, failed to respond to communications from both the real estate lawyer and agent, and provided inconsistent information regarding his availability.[7]
With closing imminent, this conduct created a real and immediate risk that the transaction would fail.
In response, the Court granted the respondent sole signing authority to execute all documents necessary to complete the sale.[8] This remedy was grounded in the need to give effect to the prior order.
Distribution of Proceeds of Sale
The Court then turned to the distribution of the sale proceeds, engaging in a detailed accounting exercise anchored in the prior order.
After payment of standard closing expenses – including real estate commission, adjustments, mortgage discharge, and legal fees – the net proceeds were calculated at approximately $250,161.34.[9]
The distribution was then determined as follows[10]:
- The respondent, as 80% owner, was entitled to her proportionate share of the net proceeds;
- She was further entitled to reimbursement of 20% of the mortgage payments she made following the relevant date set out in the prior order;
- She was also credited with 20% of the insurance premiums paid over that period;
- A prior costs award was enforced through the distribution.
These adjustments materially reduced the applicant’s recovery. While he held a 20% interest, his share was diminished by his proportionate responsibility for carrying costs and the outstanding cost award.
The Court made another costs award against the applicant on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,610.45, also payable out of his share of the sale proceeds.[11] This elevated award was driven by the Court’s finding that the applicant’s conduct was unreasonable, particularly his failure to cooperate with the sale process, and that the proceeding ought to have been avoided altogether.
The final allocation, approximately $235,486.28 to the respondent and $14,675.06 to the applicant[12], underscores a key point: in co-ownership disputes, entitlement is not determined by title alone, but by the financial realities of who carried the property.
Concluding Thoughts
Although this is a family law case, the principles translate directly to estates disputes. Courts will not allow one party’s non-cooperation to frustrate the administration or sale of property. Where necessary, they will grant one party sole authority to move matters forward. The decision also reflects a familiar estates dynamic: once rights are determined, disputes often shift to the practical work of carrying out the order, where the financial realities of who carried the asset can significantly affect outcomes. Finally, obstruction has consequences. As in estates litigation, a party who delays or impedes administration risks both a reduced recovery and an adverse costs award.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 1484.
[2] Ibid at paras 2-7.
[3] Ibid at para 8.
[4] Ibid at para 10.
[5] Ibid at para 12.
[6] Ibid at paras 13-15.
[7] Ibid at paras 17-21.
[8] Ibid at para 22.
[9] Ibid at para 28.
[10] Ibid at para 29-38.
[11] Ibid at paras 43-49.
[12] Ibid at para 41.
Written by: Emily Caza
Posted on: April 2, 2026
Categories: Commentary
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Duong v. Nguyen, , 2026 ONSC 1484[1], offers a practical and instructive example of how the Court will use its procedural tools – specifically, a reference – to ensure that a real estate transaction proceeds where one party refuses to cooperate.
More broadly, the case illustrates the Court’s willingness to intervene decisively in property disputes between former spouses or co-owners, particularly where delay or obstruction risks financial prejudice.
What Is a “Reference”?
At the outset, the Court provides a helpful reminder of “references” under Rules 54 and 55 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] A reference allows discrete issues to be determined efficiently outside of a full trial.
References are available in family law proceedings by virtue of Rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules, which permits the Court to proceed by analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure where the Family Law Rules do not adequately address a matter.
Here, the reference was triggered by a prior order requiring the sale of a jointly owned property, with disputes about implementation and distribution left to be determined later.[3]
Background
The parties jointly owned a home as tenants in common, with unequal interests[4]:
Following their separation, the Court ordered the property sold and set conditions governing the sale and distribution of proceeds.[5]
Although the property was successfully sold, the transaction was jeopardized when the Applicant failed to[6]:
This non-cooperation prompted the Respondent to seek relief through a reference on an urgent basis, heard the day before the real estate transaction was to close.
Issues
This reference required the Court to determine two core issues arising from the implementation of the prior sale order:
Analysis
Conduct of the Applicant
The Court had little difficulty concluding that the applicant’s conduct warranted intervention.
The evidentiary record established that the applicant failed to meaningfully participate in the sale process. He did not sign the necessary closing documents, failed to respond to communications from both the real estate lawyer and agent, and provided inconsistent information regarding his availability.[7]
With closing imminent, this conduct created a real and immediate risk that the transaction would fail.
In response, the Court granted the respondent sole signing authority to execute all documents necessary to complete the sale.[8] This remedy was grounded in the need to give effect to the prior order.
Distribution of Proceeds of Sale
The Court then turned to the distribution of the sale proceeds, engaging in a detailed accounting exercise anchored in the prior order.
After payment of standard closing expenses – including real estate commission, adjustments, mortgage discharge, and legal fees – the net proceeds were calculated at approximately $250,161.34.[9]
The distribution was then determined as follows[10]:
These adjustments materially reduced the applicant’s recovery. While he held a 20% interest, his share was diminished by his proportionate responsibility for carrying costs and the outstanding cost award.
The Court made another costs award against the applicant on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,610.45, also payable out of his share of the sale proceeds.[11] This elevated award was driven by the Court’s finding that the applicant’s conduct was unreasonable, particularly his failure to cooperate with the sale process, and that the proceeding ought to have been avoided altogether.
The final allocation, approximately $235,486.28 to the respondent and $14,675.06 to the applicant[12], underscores a key point: in co-ownership disputes, entitlement is not determined by title alone, but by the financial realities of who carried the property.
Concluding Thoughts
Although this is a family law case, the principles translate directly to estates disputes. Courts will not allow one party’s non-cooperation to frustrate the administration or sale of property. Where necessary, they will grant one party sole authority to move matters forward. The decision also reflects a familiar estates dynamic: once rights are determined, disputes often shift to the practical work of carrying out the order, where the financial realities of who carried the asset can significantly affect outcomes. Finally, obstruction has consequences. As in estates litigation, a party who delays or impedes administration risks both a reduced recovery and an adverse costs award.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 1484.
[2] Ibid at paras 2-7.
[3] Ibid at para 8.
[4] Ibid at para 10.
[5] Ibid at para 12.
[6] Ibid at paras 13-15.
[7] Ibid at paras 17-21.
[8] Ibid at para 22.
[9] Ibid at para 28.
[10] Ibid at para 29-38.
[11] Ibid at paras 43-49.
[12] Ibid at para 41.
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