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Morris v. Kawano: Capacity Presumption Not Easily Displaced

In Morris v. Kawano,[1] the Supreme Court of British Columbia had to rule on whether to allow a beneficiary respondent to adjourn an application to propound a will for the opportunity to cross-examine petitioner witnesses. Although not necessarily a binding decision in Ontario, it serves as important insight as to how Canadian courts may consider evidence surrounding suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of wills.

Background

The petitioner was the named trustee of the estate of her late mother, Diane Kawano (the “Deceased”) pursuant to a Last Will and Testament executed by the Deceased on January 20, 2023 (the “Will”). The Deceased passed away on December 31, 2023, after choosing to use medical assistance in dying after suffering from terminal cancer.

The petitioner applied for proof in solemn form of the Will as well as a grant of probate. The respondent filed a response to the petition challenging the validity of the Will on the grounds that the Deceased lacked capacity at the time the Will was executed, as well as undue influence enacted by the petitioner.

The Deceased and respondent had been married for 17 years at the time of the Deceased’s passing, though both had children from previous relationships. They lived together at their home in Campbell River, British Columbia (the “Home”), which was registered solely in the Deceased’s name and was by far the largest asset of her estate.

The Will seemed to have been created using an online kit with “drop down” menu options, and not by a lawyer or other professional. It was apparent that the Deceased did obtain any legal advice in relation to the Will. The Will was signed by two witnesses who were not beneficiaries, with one being one of the Deceased’s neighbours, and the other being her doctor.

The Will appoints the petitioner as Estate Trustee and in essence provides that the Home was to be sold within a year of the Deceased’s passing, with the proceeds of the sale of the Home are to be divided equally into six shares and distributed amongst the Respondent, the Deceased’s three daughters, and the Deceased’s two stepdaughters.

The petitioner admitted that she was directly involved in drafting the Will but claims that the Deceased was capable of executing the Will at the time of its creation in January of 2023.

The respondent, on the other hand, claimed that he was confident that the Will was in actuality, signed in December of 2023, at a point where the Deceased’s cancer had spread to her brain, thus rendering her incapable. He also argues that, when the contents of the Will are considered in the context of a 17-year marriage, the Deceased cannot have been aware of the effect of the disposition regarding the Home. The respondent further claimed that the Deceased’s signature in the Will did not actually match that of the Deceased.

Over the course of the litigation, the respondent’s argument changed somewhat, with the respondent submitting that, rather than deciding the application on its merits, the Court should order further discovery of documents and out-of-court cross-examination to allow the respondent to test the petitioner’s evidence. In particular, the documents sought involved various medical records.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by addressing the respondent’s claim that the signature on the Will did not match the Deceased’s signature. To support this claim, the only evidence that the respondent produced was a single sample of the Deceased’s signature with a claim, made by the respondent himself, that he did not recognize the signature.

The Court noted that the respondent did not provide any specific in depth explanation as to the differences between the signatures, nor did the respondent obtain an expert report from a handwriting analyst. The petitioner, on the other hand, provided signed affidavits sworn by the two witnesses deposing that they both had seen the Deceased sign the Will in person. The Court found that, given the lack of strong evidence outside of the mere claim made by the respondent, there is not a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the concern that the signature was not that of the Deceased.

In regard to the capacity of the Deceased, the respondent and petitioner agreed that where there is proof that a will-maker read over a will and appeared to understand it, and that will was then duly executed with the requisite formalities, the propounder of the will benefits from a rebuttable presumption that the will-maker knew and approved of the contents of the will and had the necessary testamentary capacity. Therefore, the respondent in this case had the burden of proof to show that the Deceased lacked the requisite capacity to execute the Will at the relevant time.

Under BC law, a party attacking a will based on capacity can adduce evidence of suspicious circumstances, which, if accepted, would tend to negate the testator’s testamentary capacity. The respondent pointed to the following assertions as evidence of suspicious circumstances:

  • The petitioner admitted she was directly involved in drafting the Will;
  • The respondent’s concerns that the Will was not made on January 20, but rather December 31;
  • The respondent’s assertion that the signature on the Will did not match that of the Deceased; and
  • The contents of the Will considered in the context of the 17-year marriage between the Deceased and the respondent evidence that the Deceased cannot have been aware of the effect of the disposition of the Home.

Based on these assertions, the respondent argued that the petition shouldn’t be determined summarily, and instead the Court should order further discovery of documents and out-of-court cross-examination on the affidavits sworn in support of the application.

The petitioner argued that the concerns raised by the respondent were insufficient to displace the presumption of capacity. In doing so, she relied on Allart Estate v. Allart,[2] for the proposition that it is not enough to raise a “general miasma of suspicion that something unsavoury may have occurred”; rather, the challenger must adduce evidence of a “specific and focused suspicion” that the testator may not have known and approved of the contents of the will, or may not have had capacity.

The court, having reviewed all the evidence before it, ultimately was unable to accept the respondent’s assertion that he had raised evidence amounting to suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the Will. Most if not all of the assertions that he relied on were found to entail only his uncorroborated claims, with no underlying documentary evidence.

The court did accept that here are cases where the Courts have found that a will prepared on the instructions of a person who receives a substantial benefit under it may give rise to suspicious circumstances. However, in this case, there is no evidence that the petitioner provided the instructions on how to prepare the Will. Rather, there was evidence that the Deceased provided the instructions to the petitioner, which she then followed.

While the court recognized that they had discretion to permit cross-examination on affidavits as well as other hybrid discovery processes in a summary proceeding, they found that the circumstances here did not support such an order. Namely, the respondent had not adduced any evidence whatsoever that contradicted the petitioner’s evidence in any meaningful way. Therefore, the court found no suspicious circumstances and ultimately granted the petitioner an order proving in solemn form, the Will, as well as a grant of probate in relation to it.

Final Thoughts

On review of the case law at large surrounding challenges to a will based on capacity, one can notice a distinct trend where a challenge is not allowed on the basis that the challenger cannot or has not produced requisite objective evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity. What I found interesting about this case, however, is the fact that the respondent was not yet seeking an outright finding of incapacity or finding of invalidity of the Will. Rather, the respondent only sought to have the opportunity to test the evidence of the petitioner to try to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a proper challenge. The respondent made this request in their capacity as a beneficiary to the Will and yet was still required to adduce some evidence to have the chance to test the petitioner’s evidence. Although this decision come from a BC court and not Ontario, this case ultimately underscores that a responder seeking to probe by discovery and cross‑examination must first adduce focused, objective evidence of suspicious circumstances, if they are to even be allowed the opportunity to test a petitioner’s evidence. As such it serves as yet another consideration that one must consider before launching any sort of litigation against a party seeking to propound a will. As always, documenting everything possible is the best way to protect the interests of yourself and your loved ones.

—

[1] Morris v Kawano, 2026 BCSC 1150

[2] Allart Estate v. Allart, 2014 BCSC 2211 at paras. 34-35,

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