The Ontario Superior Court of Justice was recently made to consider a claim for dependant’s support in the context of an adult child with a developmental disability in Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al.[1]
Background
The matter concerned an application for dependant’s support brought by the son (the “Applicant”) of Florence Bevins (the “Deceased”) pursuant to s.58(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”).[2] The Deceased passed in September of 2023, leaving a will dated November 14, 2022 (the “Will”). The principal asset of the Deceased’s estate (the “Estate”) was a residence located in Gananoque, Ontario, with an estimated value of $269,258.38, which the Will directed go to the Deceased’s granddaughter.
The Applicant received a 10% share of the residue of the Estate, which amounted to approximately $6,000, though he was also the designated beneficiary of the Deceased’s registered disability savings plan valued at approximately $29,000.
At the time of the application, the Applicant was 50 years old and has developmental disabilities that impacted his cognitive functioning and independence. Despite this, he lived apart from the Deceased and received income from various sources that are sufficient to pay his expenses, though his property is now managed by the Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT”). The PGT has been managing the Applicant’s property since August of 2024 and served as his litigation guardian through these proceedings. There is no clear evidence that the Deceased contributed her own funds toward the Applicant’s needs.
As of 2026, the Applicant had limited assets, and his financial position is modest. His expenses reflected his supported living environment in Kingston, Ontario, including housing, a personal allowance, and insurance. The PGT claimed that the Applicant’s current level of funding did not adequately support his lifestyle and that additional funds would improve his nutrition, clothing, personal care, and opportunities for social engagement. Additionally, it was submitted that the Applicant may have future health and mobility needs.
Analysis
Section 58(1) of the SLRA permits the court to order adequate provision for the proper support of a deceased’s dependants. The analysis proceeds in three stages: whether the applicant is a dependant, whether adequate provision has been made, and, if not, what provision should be ordered.[3]
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the Applicant constituted a “dependant” within the meaning of the SLRA. A dependant includes a child to whom the deceased was providing support, or was under a legal obligation to provide support, immediately before death. The Court noted that the evidence did not establish that the Deceased was providing financial support to the Applicant within the meaning of the SLRA as the Applicant’s living expenses were met from his own income. There was evidence that the Deceased assisted in administering the Applicant’s finances, though that role only involved the management and disbursement of the Applicant’s own funds.
The Court stated that in this case, the analysis then turns to whether the Deceased was under a legal obligation to support the Applicant by reason of his circumstances, noting that the jurisprudence in Ontario recognizes that an adult child with a disability may remain dependant notwithstanding the receipt of independent income. The relevant inquiry is whether, having regard to the child’s condition, means, and needs, the child has withdrawn from parental charge or remains in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing support obligation.
The Court, citing Weber v. Weber,[4] noted that the question is not whether an adult child can meet basic subsistence needs, but whether their resources are sufficient to meet their reasonable needs having regard to their circumstances. Considering these principles, the Court found that while the Applicant is significantly vulnerable, there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that he remained dependant on the Deceased within the meaning of the SLRA. He had lived apart from the Deceased for many years, and his daily needs are met through a comprehensive combination of public benefits and institutional services.
Even accounting for his disability, the evidence does not establish that Jason remained in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing obligation on Florence, as opposed to reliance on state and institutional structures independent of any parental role.[5] As such, it was held that the Applicant could not establish that he was a dependant.
However, given the closeness of the issue in the mind of the Court, Jenson J proceeded to consider the adequacy of provision in the alternative. If the Applicant were found to be a dependant, the Court would apply the framework for assessing the adequacy of the Deceased’s provision for him in the Will as set out in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate. Here, wthe Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that adequacy must be assessed having regard to both legal and moral obligations balanced against the principle of testamentary autonomy.[6]
Additionally, in determining whether adequate provision was made for the Applicant, the Court would consider the factors set out in s.62(1) of the SLRA,[7] which guide the assessment of a dependant’s circumstances, the competing claims on the estate, and the means and intentions of the deceased.
Jenson J noted that the Applicant’s circumstances reflected a person with limited means, modest assets, and a degree of vulnerability. While the evidence suggested that additional financial support could enhance his quality of life, his current resources allowed him to live at a basic but adequate level. When weighing these considerations alongside the circumstances of the estate, the Court noted that the estate itself here was modest and largely illiquid, and that the court must further take into account the Deceased’s expressed testamentary intentions, which reflected an effort to balance her family’s competing interests within the constraints of her limited resources.
As such, the Court found that this was not a case in which the testamentary scheme left the Applicant unable to meet his reasonable needs, nor was it one in which the deceased failed to recognize a clear legal obligation. Therefore, it was held that adequate provision was made for the Applicant’s proper support by the Deceased.
Final Thoughts
Despite the Applicant’s modest resources and means, the Court was not willing to go so far as to consider him a dependant or make a finding that the relatively modest amounts left to him by the Deceased was inadequate. In my view, the key factor in this decision hinged on the fact that the Applicant had a robust support system through the PGT to manage his property despite his relatively modest income. If that had not been the case, it is possible that the legal obligation of the Deceased to provide the Applicant support could have been much more robust, since the Court here noted that, even with this strong support system through the PGT, this is still a case that is close to the line as to whether or not the Applicant was a dependant within the meaning of the SLRA. This case is an interesting result given all the ways it could have been concluded given the myriad of conflicting case law.
—
[1] Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al, 2026 ONSC 3722
[2] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 at s.58(1)
[3] Cohen v. Cohen, 2019 ONSC 4456 (CanLII), at para. 43
[4] Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, at para. 58
[5] Supra note 1 at para 27
[6] Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, 1994 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807 at para. 33:
[7] Supra note 2 at s. 62(1)
Written by: Mark Polese
Posted on: August 27, 2026
Categories: Commentary, WEL Newsletter
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice was recently made to consider a claim for dependant’s support in the context of an adult child with a developmental disability in Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al.[1]
Background
The matter concerned an application for dependant’s support brought by the son (the “Applicant”) of Florence Bevins (the “Deceased”) pursuant to s.58(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”).[2] The Deceased passed in September of 2023, leaving a will dated November 14, 2022 (the “Will”). The principal asset of the Deceased’s estate (the “Estate”) was a residence located in Gananoque, Ontario, with an estimated value of $269,258.38, which the Will directed go to the Deceased’s granddaughter.
The Applicant received a 10% share of the residue of the Estate, which amounted to approximately $6,000, though he was also the designated beneficiary of the Deceased’s registered disability savings plan valued at approximately $29,000.
At the time of the application, the Applicant was 50 years old and has developmental disabilities that impacted his cognitive functioning and independence. Despite this, he lived apart from the Deceased and received income from various sources that are sufficient to pay his expenses, though his property is now managed by the Public Guardian and Trustee (the “PGT”). The PGT has been managing the Applicant’s property since August of 2024 and served as his litigation guardian through these proceedings. There is no clear evidence that the Deceased contributed her own funds toward the Applicant’s needs.
As of 2026, the Applicant had limited assets, and his financial position is modest. His expenses reflected his supported living environment in Kingston, Ontario, including housing, a personal allowance, and insurance. The PGT claimed that the Applicant’s current level of funding did not adequately support his lifestyle and that additional funds would improve his nutrition, clothing, personal care, and opportunities for social engagement. Additionally, it was submitted that the Applicant may have future health and mobility needs.
Analysis
Section 58(1) of the SLRA permits the court to order adequate provision for the proper support of a deceased’s dependants. The analysis proceeds in three stages: whether the applicant is a dependant, whether adequate provision has been made, and, if not, what provision should be ordered.[3]
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the Applicant constituted a “dependant” within the meaning of the SLRA. A dependant includes a child to whom the deceased was providing support, or was under a legal obligation to provide support, immediately before death. The Court noted that the evidence did not establish that the Deceased was providing financial support to the Applicant within the meaning of the SLRA as the Applicant’s living expenses were met from his own income. There was evidence that the Deceased assisted in administering the Applicant’s finances, though that role only involved the management and disbursement of the Applicant’s own funds.
The Court stated that in this case, the analysis then turns to whether the Deceased was under a legal obligation to support the Applicant by reason of his circumstances, noting that the jurisprudence in Ontario recognizes that an adult child with a disability may remain dependant notwithstanding the receipt of independent income. The relevant inquiry is whether, having regard to the child’s condition, means, and needs, the child has withdrawn from parental charge or remains in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing support obligation.
The Court, citing Weber v. Weber,[4] noted that the question is not whether an adult child can meet basic subsistence needs, but whether their resources are sufficient to meet their reasonable needs having regard to their circumstances. Considering these principles, the Court found that while the Applicant is significantly vulnerable, there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that he remained dependant on the Deceased within the meaning of the SLRA. He had lived apart from the Deceased for many years, and his daily needs are met through a comprehensive combination of public benefits and institutional services.
Even accounting for his disability, the evidence does not establish that Jason remained in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing obligation on Florence, as opposed to reliance on state and institutional structures independent of any parental role.[5] As such, it was held that the Applicant could not establish that he was a dependant.
However, given the closeness of the issue in the mind of the Court, Jenson J proceeded to consider the adequacy of provision in the alternative. If the Applicant were found to be a dependant, the Court would apply the framework for assessing the adequacy of the Deceased’s provision for him in the Will as set out in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate. Here, wthe Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that adequacy must be assessed having regard to both legal and moral obligations balanced against the principle of testamentary autonomy.[6]
Additionally, in determining whether adequate provision was made for the Applicant, the Court would consider the factors set out in s.62(1) of the SLRA,[7] which guide the assessment of a dependant’s circumstances, the competing claims on the estate, and the means and intentions of the deceased.
Jenson J noted that the Applicant’s circumstances reflected a person with limited means, modest assets, and a degree of vulnerability. While the evidence suggested that additional financial support could enhance his quality of life, his current resources allowed him to live at a basic but adequate level. When weighing these considerations alongside the circumstances of the estate, the Court noted that the estate itself here was modest and largely illiquid, and that the court must further take into account the Deceased’s expressed testamentary intentions, which reflected an effort to balance her family’s competing interests within the constraints of her limited resources.
As such, the Court found that this was not a case in which the testamentary scheme left the Applicant unable to meet his reasonable needs, nor was it one in which the deceased failed to recognize a clear legal obligation. Therefore, it was held that adequate provision was made for the Applicant’s proper support by the Deceased.
Final Thoughts
Despite the Applicant’s modest resources and means, the Court was not willing to go so far as to consider him a dependant or make a finding that the relatively modest amounts left to him by the Deceased was inadequate. In my view, the key factor in this decision hinged on the fact that the Applicant had a robust support system through the PGT to manage his property despite his relatively modest income. If that had not been the case, it is possible that the legal obligation of the Deceased to provide the Applicant support could have been much more robust, since the Court here noted that, even with this strong support system through the PGT, this is still a case that is close to the line as to whether or not the Applicant was a dependant within the meaning of the SLRA. This case is an interesting result given all the ways it could have been concluded given the myriad of conflicting case law.
—
[1] Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al, 2026 ONSC 3722
[2] Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 at s.58(1)
[3] Cohen v. Cohen, 2019 ONSC 4456 (CanLII), at para. 43
[4] Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, at para. 58
[5] Supra note 1 at para 27
[6] Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, 1994 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807 at para. 33:
[7] Supra note 2 at s. 62(1)
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