In Paletta v. Paletta et al., 2026 ONSC 4724, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered a contentious family dispute involving an 85-year-old mother, disputed powers of attorney, concerns regarding capacity, and competing attempts by her children to act in her interests.[1]
Background
Diana Paletta (“Diana”) is 85 years old and has six children, including the applicant, Renzo Paletta (“Renzo”), and the respondents, Adriana Paletta (“Adriana”), Melinda Paletta (“Melinda”) and Vincent Paletta (“Vincent”).
On May 12,2023, Diana granted a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property and a Power of Attorney for Personal Care, appointing Renzo.[2] Diana lived with Renzo at a property owned by Six Bears Investments Limited (“Six Bears”) until March 2026, when she moved to Melinda’s home.[3]
Renzo subsequently commenced an application seeking, among other things, orders for directions concerning the POAs and requiring Diana to undergo a capacity assessment.[4]
Following the commencement of the application, Adriana tendered purported revocations of the POAs dated April 7, 2026, and July 17, 2026.[5]
Section 3 counsel was appointed and reported that Diana did not wish to see or speak with Renzo, did not want a capacity assessment, did not want Renzo acting as her attorney for property, and wanted him to vacate the Six Bears property.[6]
Adriana and Melinda moved to dismiss Renzo’s application. They also sought leave under section 42(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (the “SDA”) to compel Renzo to account for his management of Diana’s property and additional relief concerning Six Bears.[7]
Issues
The Court considered whether Renzo’s application should be dismissed in light of Diana’s purported revocation of his powers of attorney and her stated refusal to undergo a capacity assessment. The Court also considered whether Adriana and Melinda should be granted leave to compel Renzo to account for his management of Diana’s property and obtain related relief.
Analysis
Issues with the Evidence
The Court identified significant evidentiary problems in the parties’ materials. Their affidavits contained numerous hearsay statements, including statements attributed to Diana that did not appear in Diana’s own brief affidavit.[8]
The Court noted that Rule 39.04(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits information and belief evidence in affidavits filed on an application to facts that are not contentious.[9] Much of the hearsay before the Court concerned matters central to the dispute. The Court therefore declined to accept several statements attributed to Diana and other third parties for the truth of their contents.
Competing Allegations
The parties presented sharply different accounts of Diana’s circumstances. Renzo maintained that he had cared for Diana and relied on evidence suggesting a decline in her cognitive and functional abilities.[10] Adriana and Melinda disputed his account and raised concerns about his caregiving and handling of Diana’s property.[11]
The Court noted that Diana’s own affidavit did not address many of the allegations being advanced on her behalf.[12] There had also been a marked shift in her family relationships: while living with Renzo, Diana reportedly did not want to see Adriana and Melinda; after moving in with Melinda, she no longer wanted to see Renzo.[13]
A Proceeding Under the SDA
Adriana and Melinda argued that Diana had revoked Renzo’s powers of attorney and that there was therefore no longer a proceeding under the SDA capable of supporting a capacity assessment under section 79.[14]
The Court disagreed. Diana’s capacity and the validity of the powers of attorney had been placed in issue before the purported revocations.[15] Further, whether those revocations were effective could itself depend upon capacity: if Diana was capable, she could revoke the powers of attorney; if she was incapable, she could not.[16]
The Court therefore found that there remained an existing proceeding under the SDA.
Reasonable Grounds to Believe Diana is Incapable
The Court emphasized that it was not deciding whether Diana was incapable or whether an assessment should ultimately be ordered.[17] Rather, the question on the motion was whether there was no basis upon which an assessment could be ordered.
The evidence was mixed. Diana’s affidavit and section 3 counsel’s report suggested that Diane had capacity to understand him and answer questions about her capacity.[18] However, her affidavit was extremely brief, the medical evidence was incomplete and equivocal, and there was evidence from Renzo and a longtime friend suggesting a decline in Diana’s cognitive and functional abilities.[19]
The Court was also concerned about Diana’s vulnerability to exploitation. Her family relationships had shifted significantly, and the evidence suggested that she was rarely alone.[20] Justice Bordin expressed concern that Diana was “caught between warring factions” and that her voice might not legitimately be heard.[21]
Although Diana did not want an assessment, the Court confirmed that her wishes were one of several factors to be considered under section 79, pursuant to the factors enumerated in Abrams v. Abrams, 2008 CanLII 67884.[22] The circumstances could lead a court to find reasonable grounds to believe Diana was incapable. The motion to dismiss was therefore dismissed.[23]
Additional Relief Sought by Adriana and Melinda
Applying Lewis v. Lewis, 2020 ONCA 56, the Court accepted that Adriana and Melinda had a genuine interest in Diana’s welfare but was not satisfied that the financial concerns raised were sufficiently significant to justify the requested relief.[24]
Importantly, if Diana was capable, she could seek an accounting herself.[25] The Court was not prepared to grant Adriana and Melinda standing to pursue relief that Diana could pursue on her own behalf.[26]
The Court similarly rejected their requests concerning the Six Bears property and corporate records. Six Bears was a separate corporate entity, and Diana, as a director and officer, could take the necessary steps herself if capable.[27]
Conclusion
Paletta demonstrates the difficult balance between respecting autonomy and protecting a potentially incapable person where family members are deeply divided.
It also provides an important reminder that an individual’s objection to a capacity assessment is relevant, but not determinative. Conversely, where a person is said to be capable, family members cannot simply assume authority to pursue relief on their behalf. In either case, the focus must remain on the individual, their capacity, and ensuring that their own voice is heard.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 4724 [Paletta].
[2] Ibid at para 8.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid at paras 3, 4.
[5] Ibid at para 23.
[6] Ibid at para 8.
[7] Ibid at para 3.
[8] Ibid at para 16.
[9] Ibid at para 17.
[10] Ibid at para 24.
[11] Ibid at para 25.
[12] Ibid at paras 24-27.
[13] Ibid at paras 27, 28.
[14] Ibid at para 33.
[15] Ibid at paras 33-35.
[16] Ibid at para 34.
[17] Ibid at para 36.
[18] Ibid at para 37.
[19] Ibid at paras 40, 41, 46.
[20] Ibid at para 52.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid at paras 38, 53.
[23] Ibid at para 53.
[24] Ibid at paras 55-59.
[25] Ibid at para 60.
[26] Ibid at para 61.
[27] Ibid at paras 63, 64.
Written by: Emily Caza
Posted on: August 29, 2026
Categories: Commentary
In Paletta v. Paletta et al., 2026 ONSC 4724, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered a contentious family dispute involving an 85-year-old mother, disputed powers of attorney, concerns regarding capacity, and competing attempts by her children to act in her interests.[1]
Background
Diana Paletta (“Diana”) is 85 years old and has six children, including the applicant, Renzo Paletta (“Renzo”), and the respondents, Adriana Paletta (“Adriana”), Melinda Paletta (“Melinda”) and Vincent Paletta (“Vincent”).
On May 12,2023, Diana granted a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property and a Power of Attorney for Personal Care, appointing Renzo.[2] Diana lived with Renzo at a property owned by Six Bears Investments Limited (“Six Bears”) until March 2026, when she moved to Melinda’s home.[3]
Renzo subsequently commenced an application seeking, among other things, orders for directions concerning the POAs and requiring Diana to undergo a capacity assessment.[4]
Following the commencement of the application, Adriana tendered purported revocations of the POAs dated April 7, 2026, and July 17, 2026.[5]
Section 3 counsel was appointed and reported that Diana did not wish to see or speak with Renzo, did not want a capacity assessment, did not want Renzo acting as her attorney for property, and wanted him to vacate the Six Bears property.[6]
Adriana and Melinda moved to dismiss Renzo’s application. They also sought leave under section 42(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (the “SDA”) to compel Renzo to account for his management of Diana’s property and additional relief concerning Six Bears.[7]
Issues
The Court considered whether Renzo’s application should be dismissed in light of Diana’s purported revocation of his powers of attorney and her stated refusal to undergo a capacity assessment. The Court also considered whether Adriana and Melinda should be granted leave to compel Renzo to account for his management of Diana’s property and obtain related relief.
Analysis
Issues with the Evidence
The Court identified significant evidentiary problems in the parties’ materials. Their affidavits contained numerous hearsay statements, including statements attributed to Diana that did not appear in Diana’s own brief affidavit.[8]
The Court noted that Rule 39.04(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits information and belief evidence in affidavits filed on an application to facts that are not contentious.[9] Much of the hearsay before the Court concerned matters central to the dispute. The Court therefore declined to accept several statements attributed to Diana and other third parties for the truth of their contents.
Competing Allegations
The parties presented sharply different accounts of Diana’s circumstances. Renzo maintained that he had cared for Diana and relied on evidence suggesting a decline in her cognitive and functional abilities.[10] Adriana and Melinda disputed his account and raised concerns about his caregiving and handling of Diana’s property.[11]
The Court noted that Diana’s own affidavit did not address many of the allegations being advanced on her behalf.[12] There had also been a marked shift in her family relationships: while living with Renzo, Diana reportedly did not want to see Adriana and Melinda; after moving in with Melinda, she no longer wanted to see Renzo.[13]
A Proceeding Under the SDA
Adriana and Melinda argued that Diana had revoked Renzo’s powers of attorney and that there was therefore no longer a proceeding under the SDA capable of supporting a capacity assessment under section 79.[14]
The Court disagreed. Diana’s capacity and the validity of the powers of attorney had been placed in issue before the purported revocations.[15] Further, whether those revocations were effective could itself depend upon capacity: if Diana was capable, she could revoke the powers of attorney; if she was incapable, she could not.[16]
The Court therefore found that there remained an existing proceeding under the SDA.
Reasonable Grounds to Believe Diana is Incapable
The Court emphasized that it was not deciding whether Diana was incapable or whether an assessment should ultimately be ordered.[17] Rather, the question on the motion was whether there was no basis upon which an assessment could be ordered.
The evidence was mixed. Diana’s affidavit and section 3 counsel’s report suggested that Diane had capacity to understand him and answer questions about her capacity.[18] However, her affidavit was extremely brief, the medical evidence was incomplete and equivocal, and there was evidence from Renzo and a longtime friend suggesting a decline in Diana’s cognitive and functional abilities.[19]
The Court was also concerned about Diana’s vulnerability to exploitation. Her family relationships had shifted significantly, and the evidence suggested that she was rarely alone.[20] Justice Bordin expressed concern that Diana was “caught between warring factions” and that her voice might not legitimately be heard.[21]
Although Diana did not want an assessment, the Court confirmed that her wishes were one of several factors to be considered under section 79, pursuant to the factors enumerated in Abrams v. Abrams, 2008 CanLII 67884.[22] The circumstances could lead a court to find reasonable grounds to believe Diana was incapable. The motion to dismiss was therefore dismissed.[23]
Additional Relief Sought by Adriana and Melinda
Applying Lewis v. Lewis, 2020 ONCA 56, the Court accepted that Adriana and Melinda had a genuine interest in Diana’s welfare but was not satisfied that the financial concerns raised were sufficiently significant to justify the requested relief.[24]
Importantly, if Diana was capable, she could seek an accounting herself.[25] The Court was not prepared to grant Adriana and Melinda standing to pursue relief that Diana could pursue on her own behalf.[26]
The Court similarly rejected their requests concerning the Six Bears property and corporate records. Six Bears was a separate corporate entity, and Diana, as a director and officer, could take the necessary steps herself if capable.[27]
Conclusion
Paletta demonstrates the difficult balance between respecting autonomy and protecting a potentially incapable person where family members are deeply divided.
It also provides an important reminder that an individual’s objection to a capacity assessment is relevant, but not determinative. Conversely, where a person is said to be capable, family members cannot simply assume authority to pursue relief on their behalf. In either case, the focus must remain on the individual, their capacity, and ensuring that their own voice is heard.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 4724 [Paletta].
[2] Ibid at para 8.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid at paras 3, 4.
[5] Ibid at para 23.
[6] Ibid at para 8.
[7] Ibid at para 3.
[8] Ibid at para 16.
[9] Ibid at para 17.
[10] Ibid at para 24.
[11] Ibid at para 25.
[12] Ibid at paras 24-27.
[13] Ibid at paras 27, 28.
[14] Ibid at para 33.
[15] Ibid at paras 33-35.
[16] Ibid at para 34.
[17] Ibid at para 36.
[18] Ibid at para 37.
[19] Ibid at paras 40, 41, 46.
[20] Ibid at para 52.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid at paras 38, 53.
[23] Ibid at para 53.
[24] Ibid at paras 55-59.
[25] Ibid at para 60.
[26] Ibid at para 61.
[27] Ibid at paras 63, 64.
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