In Laberge Gareau v. Laberge Gareau[1], the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered competing claims between a mother and her two daughters over the beneficial ownership of a family farm.
The decision addresses several equitable doctrines frequently arising in family property and estate disputes, including resulting trust, the presumption of advancement, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and proprietary estoppel.
Facts
The dispute concerned a family farm in Verner, Ontario consisting of two adjacent properties.[2] The plaintiff, Michele, purchased the first property in 1979 and remained its sole owner. In 1996, she purchased the adjacent property for $152,000. Title to that property was registered in Michele’s name “in trust” for her daughters, Joanne and Jeanne, who were 12 and 10 years old at the time.[3]
Michele funded the purchase and subsequently paid the mortgage and substantially all of the property taxes, insurance and utilities.[4] The property was incorporated into the family farming operation and used for hay, pasture and cash crops.[5]
Joanne remained on the farm into adulthood and worked extensively in the farming operation.[6] Among other things, she assisted with calving, haying, fencing, construction and day-to-day farm work, and made certain financial contributions toward farm equipment and expenses. Over the years, Michele also made statements to Joanne to the effect that the farm would someday be hers.[7]
Michele and Joanne’s relationship deteriorated beginning in approximately 2015.[8] In 2017, a portion of the second property was severed and transferred to Jeanne.[9] It was during that process that Michele learned that, because of the manner in which title had been registered in 1996, her signature was not required to complete the transfer.[10] Michele maintained that she had never intended to give beneficial ownership of the property to her daughters.
Michele commenced the action seeking a declaration that she was the beneficial owner of the remaining property.[11] Joanne opposed Michele’s claim and advanced her own claims based on her contributions to the family farm.[12]
Issues
The principal issues before the Court were[13]:
- whether Michele’s claim to beneficial ownership was barred by the Real Property Limitations Act (the “RPLA”);
- whether Michele had retained beneficial ownership of the remaining property by way of resulting trust;
- whether Joanne’s contributions to the family farm entitled her to a remedy based on unjust enrichment, including a constructive trust interest in the remaining property; and
- whether Joanne was entitled to an interest in the remaining property based on proprietary estoppel.
Analysis
1. Was Michele’s Claim Statute-Barred?
The parties agreed that the ten-year limitation period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act (the “RPLA”) applied to Michele’s claim for a resulting or constructive trust. The dispute concerned when that limitation period began to run.[14]
The Court found that section 5 of the RPLA postponed the commencement of the limitation period because Michele had remained in continuous possession of the property and continued to receive its profits.[15] Since purchasing the property in 1996, Michele had used it for hay and cash crops, rented it to other farmers and retained the income generated from it.[16] She had never been dispossessed of the property.[17] Accordingly, the limitation period had not yet begun to run.
The Court also considered discoverability as an alternative basis for its conclusion. Michele did not discover the title issue until 2017, when she learned, in connection with the severance and transfer of a portion of the property to Jeanne, that her signature was not required because her daughters were considered the beneficial owners.[18] The Court accepted that Michele had previously believed that she retained beneficial ownership of the property.
Accordingly, whether by operation of section 5 of the RPLA or the discoverability principle, Michele’s claim was not statute-barred.
2. Did Michele Retain Beneficial Ownership by Way of Resulting Trust?
The Court next considered whether Michele had retained beneficial ownership of the remaining property notwithstanding that it had been registered in trust for Joanne and Jeanne.
Because Joanne and Jeanne were minors when the property was purchased, the presumption of advancement applied.[19] Michele therefore bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that she intended to make a gift to her daughters.
The Court found that she had done so.
Of particular significance was the reporting letter from the lawyer who acted on the 1996 purchase. Although the property had been registered in trust for Joanne and Jeanne, the letter advised Michele that title was registered in her name as beneficial owner and discussed the trust arrangement in the context of avoiding the merger of the adjacent properties.[20] A formal trust agreement was contemplated but never executed.[21]
Michele’s conduct following the purchase was also consistent with her evidence that she intended to retain beneficial ownership. She provided the down payment, paid the mortgage and substantially all expenses associated with the property, incorporated it into her farming operation and retained the income it generated.[22]
The Court also considered Michele’s statements that the farm would someday belong to her daughters.[23] Those statements did not establish a present intention to gift the property. Rather, they were consistent with an intention that the daughters might receive the property at some future time, including as an inheritance.
The Court therefore held that Michele had rebutted the presumption of advancement and declared her the sole beneficial owner of the remaining property.
3. Was Joanne Entitled to a Remedy for Unjust Enrichment?
Although Michele was the beneficial owner of the property, Joanne claimed that her years of labour and financial contributions to the family farm entitled her to equitable relief.
The Court applied the three-part test for unjust enrichment: an enrichment to Michele, a corresponding deprivation to Joanne, and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.[24]
The Court accepted that Joanne had made substantial contributions to the farm.[25] She had performed significant unpaid farm labour over many years, including haying, calving, fencing, construction and other day-to-day work. She had also made certain financial contributions toward farm equipment and expenses. These contributions enriched Michele by saving her the expense or effort of performing or paying for that work herself.
The Court was also satisfied that Joanne suffered a corresponding deprivation and that there was no established juristic reason for Michele to retain the entirety of the benefit.[26]
However, the analysis did not end there. Joanne had herself received significant benefits from the arrangement. In particular, she lived with Michele for approximately 13 years as an adult without paying rent or contributing toward groceries and received certain income tax benefits associated with the farming operation.[27]
The Court cautioned that assistance provided by an adult child to a parent will not necessarily support an unjust enrichment claim.[28] In the context of a family farm, adult children may contribute labour simply because of the family relationship. The Court considered unjust enrichment to represent a “high bar” in the parent-child context.[29]
On the evidence, however, Joanne’s contributions crossed that threshold. The Court valued her compensable contributions at $264,481.16 and deducted $93,600 for the value of the free room and board she had received, resulting in an award of $170,881.16, together with prejudgment interest.[30]
Joanne sought a constructive trust interest in the remaining property rather than a monetary award. The Court declined to impose one.[31] Her contributions related to both farm properties, and the evidence did not establish a sufficiently clear connection between those contributions and the particular property over which she claimed an interest. A monetary remedy was therefore adequate.
4. Was Joanne Entitled to an Interest Based on Proprietary Estoppel?
Finally, Joanne argued that Michele’s statements that the farm would someday be hers gave rise to proprietary estoppel.
The Court accepted that Michele had made statements over the years about Joanne eventually receiving the farm.[32] There was also evidence that, during the 2017 severance, Michele told Joanne that she would receive the remainder of the farm if she agreed to the transfer of the severed portion to Jeanne.
However, the Court was not satisfied that the evidence established a sufficiently clear and unambiguous representation.[33] Joanne could not identify the precise wording of the alleged promise or when the transfer was intended to occur. At most, the evidence established a possible future intention that Joanne would receive the farm.[34]
The Court also found that Joanne had not established reasonable detrimental reliance.[35] Her own conduct demonstrated that she was uncertain whether Michele would ultimately transfer the farm to her.[36] She had declined to make certain investments because of that uncertainty and later attempted to formalize her business relationship with Michele.[37]
Accordingly, although Michele had made statements that Joanne would receive the farm “someday,” the evidence did not establish a sufficiently certain representation upon which Joanne reasonably relied to her detriment. The proprietary estoppel claim was dismissed.
Conclusion
Laberge Gareau illustrates that different equitable doctrines may produce markedly different results on the same facts. Although Joanne’s contributions and Michele’s statements about the future of the farm were insufficient to establish an ownership interest, Joanne’s substantial uncompensated contributions nevertheless supported a significant monetary remedy in unjust enrichment.
The decision serves as a useful reminder that a parent’s statements that property will belong to a child “someday” will not necessarily establish either a present gift or an enforceable promise of future ownership. However, where an adult child has made significant contributions to family property over an extended period, equity may nevertheless intervene to prevent an unjust enrichment, even where the evidence falls short of supporting a proprietary remedy.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 4669 [Laberge Gareau].
[2] Ibid at para 1.
[3] Ibid at paras 2, 11.
[4] Ibid at para 28.
[5] Ibid at para 29.
[6] Ibid at paras 13, 14.
[7] Ibid at para 15.
[8] Ibid at para 16.
[9] Ibid at para 20.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid at para 5.
[12] Ibid at paras 6-8.
[13] Ibid at paras 37-40.
[14] Ibid at para 41.
[15] Ibid at paras 49-55.
[16] Ibid at para 56.
[17] Ibid at para 57.
[18] Ibid at paras 58-59.
[19] Ibid at para 67.
[20] Ibid at para 75-76.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid at para 78.
[23] Ibid at para 81.
[24] Ibid at para 96.
[25] Ibid at paras 109-122.
[26] Ibid at para 123.
[27] Ibid at paras 127, 128.
[28] Ibid at para 129.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid at para 137.
[31] Ibid at paras 134-136.
[32] Ibid at para 144.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid at para 146.
[35] Ibid at para 148.
[36] Ibid at para 149.
[37] Ibid.
Written by: Emily Caza
Posted on: August 31, 2026
Categories: Commentary
In Laberge Gareau v. Laberge Gareau[1], the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered competing claims between a mother and her two daughters over the beneficial ownership of a family farm.
The decision addresses several equitable doctrines frequently arising in family property and estate disputes, including resulting trust, the presumption of advancement, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and proprietary estoppel.
Facts
The dispute concerned a family farm in Verner, Ontario consisting of two adjacent properties.[2] The plaintiff, Michele, purchased the first property in 1979 and remained its sole owner. In 1996, she purchased the adjacent property for $152,000. Title to that property was registered in Michele’s name “in trust” for her daughters, Joanne and Jeanne, who were 12 and 10 years old at the time.[3]
Michele funded the purchase and subsequently paid the mortgage and substantially all of the property taxes, insurance and utilities.[4] The property was incorporated into the family farming operation and used for hay, pasture and cash crops.[5]
Joanne remained on the farm into adulthood and worked extensively in the farming operation.[6] Among other things, she assisted with calving, haying, fencing, construction and day-to-day farm work, and made certain financial contributions toward farm equipment and expenses. Over the years, Michele also made statements to Joanne to the effect that the farm would someday be hers.[7]
Michele and Joanne’s relationship deteriorated beginning in approximately 2015.[8] In 2017, a portion of the second property was severed and transferred to Jeanne.[9] It was during that process that Michele learned that, because of the manner in which title had been registered in 1996, her signature was not required to complete the transfer.[10] Michele maintained that she had never intended to give beneficial ownership of the property to her daughters.
Michele commenced the action seeking a declaration that she was the beneficial owner of the remaining property.[11] Joanne opposed Michele’s claim and advanced her own claims based on her contributions to the family farm.[12]
Issues
The principal issues before the Court were[13]:
Analysis
1. Was Michele’s Claim Statute-Barred?
The parties agreed that the ten-year limitation period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act (the “RPLA”) applied to Michele’s claim for a resulting or constructive trust. The dispute concerned when that limitation period began to run.[14]
The Court found that section 5 of the RPLA postponed the commencement of the limitation period because Michele had remained in continuous possession of the property and continued to receive its profits.[15] Since purchasing the property in 1996, Michele had used it for hay and cash crops, rented it to other farmers and retained the income generated from it.[16] She had never been dispossessed of the property.[17] Accordingly, the limitation period had not yet begun to run.
The Court also considered discoverability as an alternative basis for its conclusion. Michele did not discover the title issue until 2017, when she learned, in connection with the severance and transfer of a portion of the property to Jeanne, that her signature was not required because her daughters were considered the beneficial owners.[18] The Court accepted that Michele had previously believed that she retained beneficial ownership of the property.
Accordingly, whether by operation of section 5 of the RPLA or the discoverability principle, Michele’s claim was not statute-barred.
2. Did Michele Retain Beneficial Ownership by Way of Resulting Trust?
The Court next considered whether Michele had retained beneficial ownership of the remaining property notwithstanding that it had been registered in trust for Joanne and Jeanne.
Because Joanne and Jeanne were minors when the property was purchased, the presumption of advancement applied.[19] Michele therefore bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that she intended to make a gift to her daughters.
The Court found that she had done so.
Of particular significance was the reporting letter from the lawyer who acted on the 1996 purchase. Although the property had been registered in trust for Joanne and Jeanne, the letter advised Michele that title was registered in her name as beneficial owner and discussed the trust arrangement in the context of avoiding the merger of the adjacent properties.[20] A formal trust agreement was contemplated but never executed.[21]
Michele’s conduct following the purchase was also consistent with her evidence that she intended to retain beneficial ownership. She provided the down payment, paid the mortgage and substantially all expenses associated with the property, incorporated it into her farming operation and retained the income it generated.[22]
The Court also considered Michele’s statements that the farm would someday belong to her daughters.[23] Those statements did not establish a present intention to gift the property. Rather, they were consistent with an intention that the daughters might receive the property at some future time, including as an inheritance.
The Court therefore held that Michele had rebutted the presumption of advancement and declared her the sole beneficial owner of the remaining property.
3. Was Joanne Entitled to a Remedy for Unjust Enrichment?
Although Michele was the beneficial owner of the property, Joanne claimed that her years of labour and financial contributions to the family farm entitled her to equitable relief.
The Court applied the three-part test for unjust enrichment: an enrichment to Michele, a corresponding deprivation to Joanne, and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.[24]
The Court accepted that Joanne had made substantial contributions to the farm.[25] She had performed significant unpaid farm labour over many years, including haying, calving, fencing, construction and other day-to-day work. She had also made certain financial contributions toward farm equipment and expenses. These contributions enriched Michele by saving her the expense or effort of performing or paying for that work herself.
The Court was also satisfied that Joanne suffered a corresponding deprivation and that there was no established juristic reason for Michele to retain the entirety of the benefit.[26]
However, the analysis did not end there. Joanne had herself received significant benefits from the arrangement. In particular, she lived with Michele for approximately 13 years as an adult without paying rent or contributing toward groceries and received certain income tax benefits associated with the farming operation.[27]
The Court cautioned that assistance provided by an adult child to a parent will not necessarily support an unjust enrichment claim.[28] In the context of a family farm, adult children may contribute labour simply because of the family relationship. The Court considered unjust enrichment to represent a “high bar” in the parent-child context.[29]
On the evidence, however, Joanne’s contributions crossed that threshold. The Court valued her compensable contributions at $264,481.16 and deducted $93,600 for the value of the free room and board she had received, resulting in an award of $170,881.16, together with prejudgment interest.[30]
Joanne sought a constructive trust interest in the remaining property rather than a monetary award. The Court declined to impose one.[31] Her contributions related to both farm properties, and the evidence did not establish a sufficiently clear connection between those contributions and the particular property over which she claimed an interest. A monetary remedy was therefore adequate.
4. Was Joanne Entitled to an Interest Based on Proprietary Estoppel?
Finally, Joanne argued that Michele’s statements that the farm would someday be hers gave rise to proprietary estoppel.
The Court accepted that Michele had made statements over the years about Joanne eventually receiving the farm.[32] There was also evidence that, during the 2017 severance, Michele told Joanne that she would receive the remainder of the farm if she agreed to the transfer of the severed portion to Jeanne.
However, the Court was not satisfied that the evidence established a sufficiently clear and unambiguous representation.[33] Joanne could not identify the precise wording of the alleged promise or when the transfer was intended to occur. At most, the evidence established a possible future intention that Joanne would receive the farm.[34]
The Court also found that Joanne had not established reasonable detrimental reliance.[35] Her own conduct demonstrated that she was uncertain whether Michele would ultimately transfer the farm to her.[36] She had declined to make certain investments because of that uncertainty and later attempted to formalize her business relationship with Michele.[37]
Accordingly, although Michele had made statements that Joanne would receive the farm “someday,” the evidence did not establish a sufficiently certain representation upon which Joanne reasonably relied to her detriment. The proprietary estoppel claim was dismissed.
Conclusion
Laberge Gareau illustrates that different equitable doctrines may produce markedly different results on the same facts. Although Joanne’s contributions and Michele’s statements about the future of the farm were insufficient to establish an ownership interest, Joanne’s substantial uncompensated contributions nevertheless supported a significant monetary remedy in unjust enrichment.
The decision serves as a useful reminder that a parent’s statements that property will belong to a child “someday” will not necessarily establish either a present gift or an enforceable promise of future ownership. However, where an adult child has made significant contributions to family property over an extended period, equity may nevertheless intervene to prevent an unjust enrichment, even where the evidence falls short of supporting a proprietary remedy.
—
[1] 2026 ONSC 4669 [Laberge Gareau].
[2] Ibid at para 1.
[3] Ibid at paras 2, 11.
[4] Ibid at para 28.
[5] Ibid at para 29.
[6] Ibid at paras 13, 14.
[7] Ibid at para 15.
[8] Ibid at para 16.
[9] Ibid at para 20.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid at para 5.
[12] Ibid at paras 6-8.
[13] Ibid at paras 37-40.
[14] Ibid at para 41.
[15] Ibid at paras 49-55.
[16] Ibid at para 56.
[17] Ibid at para 57.
[18] Ibid at paras 58-59.
[19] Ibid at para 67.
[20] Ibid at para 75-76.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid at para 78.
[23] Ibid at para 81.
[24] Ibid at para 96.
[25] Ibid at paras 109-122.
[26] Ibid at para 123.
[27] Ibid at paras 127, 128.
[28] Ibid at para 129.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid at para 137.
[31] Ibid at paras 134-136.
[32] Ibid at para 144.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid at para 146.
[35] Ibid at para 148.
[36] Ibid at para 149.
[37] Ibid.
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