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Presumption of Revocation of Will By Destruction

1. Introduction

If a testator is known to have had possession of his will before he died and the will cannot be located after his death, the law presumes that he destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it. However, the presumption is rebuttable. The issue arose on Re Jugovits Estate.[1]

2. Facts

Laszlo Jugovitz (the ‘deceased’) made his Will on 26 May 2021 and died in November 2023 at age 89. He was survived by his biological son Laszlo Jr and by four stepdaughters, Erika Inazio, Judith Schur, Ilona Smith, and Erzsebet McLeod, who were the daughters of Julianna Adorjan. The deceased began living with Juliana and her daughters in 1967. Juliana and the deceased lived together for 42 years until she died in 2009. They were joint tenants of their family home. The deceased did not legally adopt Julianna’s daughters, but their evidence was that they considered the deceased to be their father. In 2018 he appointed Ilona and Erika joint representatives under a representation agreement and gave them authority to make health care decisions for him and to manage his financial affairs. In 2021, shortly before he executed his will, the deceased named Erika his attorney in a power of attorney and Ilona as his substitute attorney. The Will left the following specific gifts: $25,000 to Erika, $50,00 to Ilona, $100,000 to Erzsebet, and $100,000 to Judith. It left the residue to Laszlo Jr and named Erika as executor.

Laszlo Jr and Erika made two competing petitions. Laszlo Jr alleged that he witnessed the deceased destroy the Will in October 2023 and submitted that he did so with the intention of revoking it. If that was so, he died intestate and Laszlo Jr would inherit the entire estate as the deceased’s only surviving descendant. Erika disputed the allegation that the deceased destroyed the will and sought to have a copy of it probated. She also alleged that there was overwhelming evidence that the deceased suffered from severe dementia and therefore lacked the necessary capacity to revoke the Will. Both petitioners took the position that the matter could be resolved summarily on the basis of affidavit evidence, and Justice Hoffman agreed.

3. Analysis and Judgment

Justice Hoffman began her analysis by referring to section 55(1)(c) of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act,[2] which provides in part that a will (other than an electronic will) is revoked when the will-maker destroys the will with the intention of revoking it. Then she described the presumption of revocation mentioned above and noted that the burden of proof rests on the party denying that the will was revoked by demonstrating that it was merely lost or displaced. She also noted that the presumption ceases to operate if the testator has become mentally incapable after he made the will, since in that case it can no longer be presumed that he had the capacity to revoke it. And thus, if there is evidence casting doubt on the testator’s capacity, the burden of proof shifts to the party alleging revocation to prove that the testator had capacity when he destroyed the will. Justice Hoffman stated[3] that she ‘must be satisfied that at the time of revocation the deceased was capable of having a reasonable understanding of the implications for his estate and his beneficiaries if he were to revoke his will’.

Thus, the test of capacity for revocation is the same as for making a will.[4] And Justice Hoffman rejected Laszlo Jr’s submission that a lesser standard of capacity is required to revoke a will than to make one.

Justice Hoffman held that, apart from the question whether the deceased had the necessary capacity to revoke his will, the presumption of revocation could operate in this case because although there was an eyewitness to the destruction, the remains of the allegedly torn wills or the original will were not found.

The parties did not dispute that the deceased was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease in the years before his death. Further the medical records showed evidence of progressive dementia and that the deceased continued to lack capacity to direct his care or make health care decisions. They also showed that the deceased had claw hands and therefore could no longer grab onto and hold things. Justice Hoffman found that there was ample evidence casting doubt on the deceased’s mental capacity around the time the Will was allegedly revoked, and therefore she held that the presumption of revocation did not apply in this case.

As noted above, this meant that the burden fell on Laszlo Jr to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Will was revoked and that the deceased had the required capacity to intentionally revoke it. The only evidence of revocation was given by Laszlo Jr. However, at least two other witnesses deposed that Laszlo Jr had the original Will in his possession as well as a power of attorney and that he identified them as such to one of the witnesses. And another witness deposed that on 14 January 2024 Laszlo Jr placed the Will in front of her on the dining room table. She noticed that it clearly read ‘Last Will and Testament’ and that it was not marked as a copy. Further, a certified copy of the Will was sent to all the siblings in January, two days after Laszlo was alleged to have the original. Consequently, the will that Laszlo Jr showed the second witness on 14 January 2024 was not a copy. Thus, Justice Hoffman found, bearing in mind that the only evidence of destruction was given by Laszlo Jr, who was not a disinterested party, that Laszlo Jr had not met the onus of establishing on a balance of possibilities that the deceased destroyed the original will. Moreover, the affidavit evidence demonstrated a clear animus between Laszlo Jr and his stepsisters and that he wanted to continue living in the deceased’s house. Although the doctrine of suspicious circumstances applies to the making of a will rather than its revocation, Justice Hoffman held that suspicions are also raised when a beneficiary who stands to benefit from a testator dying without a will, is a witness to the alleged revocation. In any event, Laszlo Jr failed to counter the evidence of the two witnesses who deposed that he had the original Will in his possession. All the evidence caused Justice Hoffman to doubt the credibility of Laszlo Jr’s evidence. Moreover, since the medical evidence showed that the deceased had claw hands and could no longer grasp things, it was doubtful that he was physically able to destroy the Will.

If he was wrong in holding that the deceased did not destroy the original Will, Justice Hoffman went on to consider whether the deceased had the required mental capacity to form the intention to revoke his Will. For this purpose, she referred to a recorded conversation between the deceased and Laszlo and found that it raised more questions about the deceased’s capacity and the possibility of Laszlo Jr’s undue influence over him. Hence, she concluded that she could not rely on the transcript of the conversation. There was also a recorded conversation between the deceased and Ilona, which confirmed the specific gifts the deceased made in favour of his stepdaughters. Having reviewed all the evidence, she was not satisfied that there was sufficient independent and reliable evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that the deceased had the requisite capacity to revoke his Will.

Accordingly, Justice Hoffman approved the copy of the Will in solemn form that the copy be submitted to probate.

—

[1] 2026 BCSC 269.

[2] SBC 2009, c 405.

[3] 2026 BCSC 269, para 29, citing Laszlo v Lawton, 2013 BCSC 305, paras 194-197.

[4] Citing Laszlo v Lawton, ibid, para 188; Re Schwartz, (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 15 at 32.

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