In Verma v. Bhooi[1], 2025 ONSC 4260, Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal dismissed a tangled web of claims advanced by, Dipakshi Verma (“Dipakshi”), against her late husband’s former wife, Rajinder Bhooi (“Rajinder”). The late husband, Jaswinder Singh Bhooi (“Jaswinder”) passed away in April 2021, in the middle of this case. While alive, Jaswinder had mislead both women about the nature of his relationships. His deception and false promises led to a decade-long legal battle involving allegations of beneficial ownership, constructive and express trusts, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment, and spousal support.
The Court ultimately found that Dipakshi’s trust and equalization claims were unsupported by the evidence and that she lacked standing to pursue them on behalf of her late husband’s estate. Only her claim for spousal support succeeded in part.
Factual Background
At the centre of the case was a commercial property on Britannia Rd. in Mississauga (the “Britannia Property”), legally owned by a numbered company, 1662054 Ontario Inc (“166”). The Respondent, Rajinder incorporated this company in 2005 and was its sole shareholder. The unit served as an auto body shop and later as a base for a home renovation business operated by Jaswinder.
Dipakshi and Jaswinder married in 2002, following an affair that began during Jaswinder’s marriage to Rajinder. Despite the divorce, Jaswinder continued living with Rajinder and their daughter, Nimerta, often misleading both women about the state of his relationships. Dipakshi alleged that Jaswinder repeatedly told her that the Britannia Property belonged to them both, and that he had purchased it through a corporation. He gave her a “Trust Agreement” in 2012 purporting to grant her a 50% interest in 166 and his auto detailing business. He also gave her a copy of a will that left her half of his estate – then revoked it a week later, naming Rajinder and Nimerta as beneficiaries instead.
Jaswinder operated businesses out of the Britannia Property, signed cheques from 166’s bank account (without authority), and maintained the Britannia Property.
Dipakshi alleged that the Britannia Property was held in trust for Jaswinder. She claimed that she materially contributed to the Britannia Property by working at Jaswinder auto body shop and was entitled to a constructive trust. She also alleged that Jaswinder had fraudulently conveyed assets to Rajinder to defeat creditors and deprive her of her rightful entitlements.
Rajinder, in response, asserted that she alone owned the Britannia Property, and that Jaswinder had no ownership interest. Jaswinder himself denied ownership in prior proceedings, characterizing the Trust Agreement as a fabrication meant to “keep [Dipakshi] happy.” When died in April 2021, midway through the litigation, Rajinder was named estate trustee in his last will and was ordered to continue the proceedings in a representative capacity.
Issues
The Court addressed four central issues:
- Was Rajinder holding the shares of 166 or the Britannia Property in trust for Jaswinder?
- Was Jaswinder unjustly enriched by Dipakshi’s contributions to the Britannia Property?
- Did Jaswinder fraudulently convey property to Rajinder?
- Is Dipakshi entitled to spousal support?[2]
Analysis
1. No Trust Interest
a) Standing and Substance
The court first determined that Dipakshi, as Jaswinder’s former spouse, does not have the standing to bring a trust claim against Rajinder (a third party) on behalf of Jaswinder’s estate for equalization purposes.[3] This is supported by the legal precedent set in the case of Karatzoglou v Commisso, 2023 ONCA 738. Although this point alone could resolve the issue, the court chose to review Dipakshi’s other arguments to provide a comprehensive conclusion.[4]
For a valid trust to exist, there must be:
- Certainty of intention to create a trust.
- Certainty of the subject matter (in this case, the shares and property).
- Certainty of the objects (the beneficiaries).[5]
b) Jaswinder’s Actions and Intent
Dipakshi argued that Jaswinder’s actions demonstrated a trust existed, including his statements to her that the Britannia Property was “for us,” a trust agreement he gave her stating she owned 50% of the shares, and her own contributions to the property.[6] However, the court found this was not sufficient proof.
Evidence showed that Jaswinder was a liar and a cheat. He repeatedly affirmed in testimony that he had no interest in the property.[7] He created the trust agreement and will to placate Dipakshi, and he forged cheques to pay their rent.[8] His actions, while misleading to Dipakshi, did not prove that Rajinder intended to hold the property in trust for him.[9]
c) Rajinder’s Credibility and Ownership
Dipakshi also challenged Rajinder’s credibility, pointing to inconsistencies in her testimony about her relationship with Jaswinder and the ownership of the property.[10] The court found that these inconsistencies were not a sign of dishonesty but rather a result of a confusing and complex relationship with Jaswinder, who was a known liar.[11]
The court found Rajinder’s evidence to be credible overall. Rajinder’s testimony aligned with Jaswinder’s; that Rajinder bought the property with Balwant’s help as an investment for their granddaughter, Nimerta’s, future.[12] While Jaswinder was involved in managing the property and business, he did so without any expectation of ownership or financial return.[13]
2. No Constructive Trust – No Enrichment or Deprivation
Dipakshi also claimed that she was entitled to a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment. Relying on Moore v. Sweet[14], 2018 SCC 52, she argued that she contributed unpaid labour toward Jaswinder’s businesses and property maintenance and was therefore deprived.[15]
The Court disagreed. While Dipakshi may have assisted Jaswinder with errands, cleaning, and minor renovation tasks, her contributions were not tied to the enhancement or preservation of the Britannia Property.[16] Moreover, there was no evidence that her labour allowed Jaswinder to save costs or that it enriched him financially.[17] Without a tangible benefit passed from her to him, the claim for constructive trust could not succeed.
The Court also found that Jaswinder’s net family property was zero.[18] As a result, there was no equalization payment owing and no basis to order an unequal division under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.[19]
3. No Fraudulent Conveyance – No Standing, No Conveyance
Dipakshi’s claim under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act also failed.[20] To succeed, she had to establish that she was a creditor of Jaswinder, that Jaswinder conveyed property to Rajinder, and that he did so with the intent to defeat creditors.[21]
Justice Agarwal found that Dipakshi was not a creditor in 2005 when the property was purchased, and there was no conveyance from Jaswinder to Rajinder.[22] Jaswinder never held legal or beneficial title to the property, nor did he transfer any assets.[23] The down payment was made by Balwant, not Jaswinder.[24] Accordingly, there was no fraudulent conveyance, and no basis to impose a remedial trust.\
4. Spousal Support – Partial Success
The only claim that succeeded was Dipakshi’s entitlement to retroactive spousal support. Relying on findings regarding imputed income from an earlier ruling by Justice Emery in 2019 and based on Rajinder’s own concessions[25], the Court ordered Jaswinder’s estate to pay lump sum support in the amount of $12,133.33, with interest.[26]
Final Thoughts
This decision underscores the risks of informal promises and reliance on verbal assurances in property disputes, especially after a party dies. As Justice Agarwal observed, “It’s sad that Jaswinder’s dishonesty left both parties fighting over his meagre assets and broken promises”.[27] The case also reinforces procedural limitations, including the importance of standing when asserting claims on behalf of a deceased’s estate.
In the end, despite years of litigation and complex factual allegations, the only relief granted was a modest support order, hardly compensation for what Dipakshi believed she was owed.
—
[1] Verma v. Bhooi, 2025 ONSC 4260 [Verma].
[2] Ibid at para 51.
[3] Ibid at paras 55 – 57.
[4] Ibid at para 58.
[5] Ibid at para 54.
[6] Ibid at paras 62–66.
[7] Ibid at para 67.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid at para 69.
[10] Ibid at para 72.
[11] Ibid at para 80.
[12] Ibid at paras 71, 100.
[13] Ibid at paras 85–87, 98.
[14] Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52.
[15] Verma, supra note 1 at paras 105–106.
[16] Ibid at para 107.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid at para 109.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid at para 114.
[21] Ibid at para 115.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid at para 31.
[26] Ibid at para 117.
[27] Ibid at para 119.
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Written by: Emily Caza
Posted on: August 14, 2025
Categories: Commentary
In Verma v. Bhooi[1], 2025 ONSC 4260, Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal dismissed a tangled web of claims advanced by, Dipakshi Verma (“Dipakshi”), against her late husband’s former wife, Rajinder Bhooi (“Rajinder”). The late husband, Jaswinder Singh Bhooi (“Jaswinder”) passed away in April 2021, in the middle of this case. While alive, Jaswinder had mislead both women about the nature of his relationships. His deception and false promises led to a decade-long legal battle involving allegations of beneficial ownership, constructive and express trusts, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment, and spousal support.
The Court ultimately found that Dipakshi’s trust and equalization claims were unsupported by the evidence and that she lacked standing to pursue them on behalf of her late husband’s estate. Only her claim for spousal support succeeded in part.
Factual Background
At the centre of the case was a commercial property on Britannia Rd. in Mississauga (the “Britannia Property”), legally owned by a numbered company, 1662054 Ontario Inc (“166”). The Respondent, Rajinder incorporated this company in 2005 and was its sole shareholder. The unit served as an auto body shop and later as a base for a home renovation business operated by Jaswinder.
Dipakshi and Jaswinder married in 2002, following an affair that began during Jaswinder’s marriage to Rajinder. Despite the divorce, Jaswinder continued living with Rajinder and their daughter, Nimerta, often misleading both women about the state of his relationships. Dipakshi alleged that Jaswinder repeatedly told her that the Britannia Property belonged to them both, and that he had purchased it through a corporation. He gave her a “Trust Agreement” in 2012 purporting to grant her a 50% interest in 166 and his auto detailing business. He also gave her a copy of a will that left her half of his estate – then revoked it a week later, naming Rajinder and Nimerta as beneficiaries instead.
Jaswinder operated businesses out of the Britannia Property, signed cheques from 166’s bank account (without authority), and maintained the Britannia Property.
Dipakshi alleged that the Britannia Property was held in trust for Jaswinder. She claimed that she materially contributed to the Britannia Property by working at Jaswinder auto body shop and was entitled to a constructive trust. She also alleged that Jaswinder had fraudulently conveyed assets to Rajinder to defeat creditors and deprive her of her rightful entitlements.
Rajinder, in response, asserted that she alone owned the Britannia Property, and that Jaswinder had no ownership interest. Jaswinder himself denied ownership in prior proceedings, characterizing the Trust Agreement as a fabrication meant to “keep [Dipakshi] happy.” When died in April 2021, midway through the litigation, Rajinder was named estate trustee in his last will and was ordered to continue the proceedings in a representative capacity.
Issues
The Court addressed four central issues:
Analysis
1. No Trust Interest
a) Standing and Substance
The court first determined that Dipakshi, as Jaswinder’s former spouse, does not have the standing to bring a trust claim against Rajinder (a third party) on behalf of Jaswinder’s estate for equalization purposes.[3] This is supported by the legal precedent set in the case of Karatzoglou v Commisso, 2023 ONCA 738. Although this point alone could resolve the issue, the court chose to review Dipakshi’s other arguments to provide a comprehensive conclusion.[4]
For a valid trust to exist, there must be:
b) Jaswinder’s Actions and Intent
Dipakshi argued that Jaswinder’s actions demonstrated a trust existed, including his statements to her that the Britannia Property was “for us,” a trust agreement he gave her stating she owned 50% of the shares, and her own contributions to the property.[6] However, the court found this was not sufficient proof.
Evidence showed that Jaswinder was a liar and a cheat. He repeatedly affirmed in testimony that he had no interest in the property.[7] He created the trust agreement and will to placate Dipakshi, and he forged cheques to pay their rent.[8] His actions, while misleading to Dipakshi, did not prove that Rajinder intended to hold the property in trust for him.[9]
c) Rajinder’s Credibility and Ownership
Dipakshi also challenged Rajinder’s credibility, pointing to inconsistencies in her testimony about her relationship with Jaswinder and the ownership of the property.[10] The court found that these inconsistencies were not a sign of dishonesty but rather a result of a confusing and complex relationship with Jaswinder, who was a known liar.[11]
The court found Rajinder’s evidence to be credible overall. Rajinder’s testimony aligned with Jaswinder’s; that Rajinder bought the property with Balwant’s help as an investment for their granddaughter, Nimerta’s, future.[12] While Jaswinder was involved in managing the property and business, he did so without any expectation of ownership or financial return.[13]
2. No Constructive Trust – No Enrichment or Deprivation
Dipakshi also claimed that she was entitled to a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment. Relying on Moore v. Sweet[14], 2018 SCC 52, she argued that she contributed unpaid labour toward Jaswinder’s businesses and property maintenance and was therefore deprived.[15]
The Court disagreed. While Dipakshi may have assisted Jaswinder with errands, cleaning, and minor renovation tasks, her contributions were not tied to the enhancement or preservation of the Britannia Property.[16] Moreover, there was no evidence that her labour allowed Jaswinder to save costs or that it enriched him financially.[17] Without a tangible benefit passed from her to him, the claim for constructive trust could not succeed.
The Court also found that Jaswinder’s net family property was zero.[18] As a result, there was no equalization payment owing and no basis to order an unequal division under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.[19]
3. No Fraudulent Conveyance – No Standing, No Conveyance
Dipakshi’s claim under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act also failed.[20] To succeed, she had to establish that she was a creditor of Jaswinder, that Jaswinder conveyed property to Rajinder, and that he did so with the intent to defeat creditors.[21]
Justice Agarwal found that Dipakshi was not a creditor in 2005 when the property was purchased, and there was no conveyance from Jaswinder to Rajinder.[22] Jaswinder never held legal or beneficial title to the property, nor did he transfer any assets.[23] The down payment was made by Balwant, not Jaswinder.[24] Accordingly, there was no fraudulent conveyance, and no basis to impose a remedial trust.\
4. Spousal Support – Partial Success
The only claim that succeeded was Dipakshi’s entitlement to retroactive spousal support. Relying on findings regarding imputed income from an earlier ruling by Justice Emery in 2019 and based on Rajinder’s own concessions[25], the Court ordered Jaswinder’s estate to pay lump sum support in the amount of $12,133.33, with interest.[26]
Final Thoughts
This decision underscores the risks of informal promises and reliance on verbal assurances in property disputes, especially after a party dies. As Justice Agarwal observed, “It’s sad that Jaswinder’s dishonesty left both parties fighting over his meagre assets and broken promises”.[27] The case also reinforces procedural limitations, including the importance of standing when asserting claims on behalf of a deceased’s estate.
In the end, despite years of litigation and complex factual allegations, the only relief granted was a modest support order, hardly compensation for what Dipakshi believed she was owed.
—
[1] Verma v. Bhooi, 2025 ONSC 4260 [Verma].
[2] Ibid at para 51.
[3] Ibid at paras 55 – 57.
[4] Ibid at para 58.
[5] Ibid at para 54.
[6] Ibid at paras 62–66.
[7] Ibid at para 67.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid at para 69.
[10] Ibid at para 72.
[11] Ibid at para 80.
[12] Ibid at paras 71, 100.
[13] Ibid at paras 85–87, 98.
[14] Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52.
[15] Verma, supra note 1 at paras 105–106.
[16] Ibid at para 107.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid at para 109.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid at para 114.
[21] Ibid at para 115.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid at para 31.
[26] Ibid at para 117.
[27] Ibid at para 119.
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