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Compassion and Capacity in Guardianship: Salmon v. Reid

In Salmon v. Reid[1], 2025 ONSC 6106, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (per Justice Brownstone) appointed a mother as guardian of property for her profoundly disabled son, confirming that guardianship under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (“SDA”) is appropriate where no lesser alternative can adequately protect an incapable person’s interests. The case demonstrates how the Court balances the protective purpose of the SDA with a compassionate understanding of long-term caregiving realities.

Background

The application arose in the aftermath of tragic circumstances. In 2014, seven-year-old Jushae Reid (“Jushae”) suffered catastrophic injuries after falling from a third-story window in his Toronto townhouse.[2] Litigation followed against the Toronto Community Housing Corporation. The case eventually settled in 2024, with approval granted under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[3]

At the time, it was contemplated that Jushae’s mother, Ms. Salmon, would apply to be appointed as his guardian of property to manage the settlement proceeds.[4] As Jushae approached his eighteenth birthday, the guardianship application proceeded under the SDA rather than the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”), with input from the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”). The matter was determined in writing pursuant to s. 77 of the SDA.[5]

Issues

The Court addressed four interrelated issues:

  1. The Governing Principles of the SDA
  2. Notice and Procedural Matters
  3. Finding of Incapacity
  4. Appointment of Ms. Salmon

Analysis

1. Governing Principles under the SDA

Justice Brownstone began by setting out the key provisions of the SDA governing guardianship of property.[6] Under s. 22(1), a guardian may be appointed where a person is incapable of managing property and it is necessary for someone else to make decisions on their behalf. Importantly, pursuant to s. 22(3) the Court may not appoint a guardian if a less restrictive alternative would meet the person’s needs.

A person is incapable of managing property under s. 6 if they are unable to understand information relevant to property decisions or to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decisions or lack thereof.

The Court also highlighted procedural provisions: s. 69’s notice requirements to the PGT and family members, and the Court’s power under s. 77 to decide the matter in writing where no notice of appearance is filed and the required materials are complete.

2. Notice

Notice of the application was served on the PGT, who reviewed the draft materials, proposed minor revisions, and raised no concerns with the draft order.[7]

Ms. Salmon sought to dispense with notice to both Jushae and his biological father.[8] The Court agreed that service on Jushae would serve no purpose given his inability to understand or engage with the materials.[9] Service on his father was also dispensed with: he had not been involved in Jushae’s life since 2010, showed no concern or interest in his son, and his whereabouts were unknown.[10]

3. Finding of Incapacity

A designated SDA assessor, Louise Silverston, conducted the capacity assessment.[11] Her report painted a clear and compassionate picture of Jushae’s profound limitations[12]:

  • He is non-verbal and requires 24/7 supervised care;
  • Diagnoses of autism and ADHD predated the accident;
  • The 2014 fall caused a traumatic brain injury;
  • He is “unable to appoint a power of attorney and is highly vulnerable to exploitation”;
  • He cannot recognize coins or paper money, perform calculations, or comprehend financial information.

Ms. Silverston concluded that there was, “no question of his need for court-ordered guardianship of property for his lifetime.”[13] Justice Brownstone accepted this opinion, finding no hesitation in declaring Jushae incapable within the meaning of s. 6 of the SDA.[14]

4. Appointment of Ms. Salmon as Guardian

Justice Brownstone emphasized that there was no less restrictive alternative than appointing a guardian.[15] Jushae’s cognitive limitations were severe and lifelong.

The Court found Ms. Salmon uniquely qualified for the role. The evidence described her as “utterly devoted to [Jushae’s] quality of life and happiness.”[16] She had provided full-time care since his birth, given up employment to attend to his needs, and managed all aspects of his daily living and finances.[17]

Her management plan was detailed and realistic, setting out expenditures for social work, occupational therapy, attendant care, diet, transportation, and other personal expenses.[18] She confirmed her understanding of fiduciary obligations and her intention to maintain detailed accounts and seek financial advice as required.[19]

Justice Brownstone concluded that Ms. Salmon’s lifelong dedication, practical knowledge, and understanding of her responsibilities made her an appropriate and trustworthy guardian.

Final Thoughts

Salmon v. Reid provides a humane and practical application of guardianship law. It reaffirms that guardianship is not a punitive or bureaucratic measure but a protective one, rooted in the SDA’s core purpose of ensuring that decisions are made in the best interests of those who cannot make them themselves.

For litigation lawyers, the decision is also a breath of fresh air: a rare example of an uncontested guardianship proceeding that reminds us of how the SDA should ideally be used – to protect, not to litigate. It reflects how the court process, even when technical and document-driven, can operate with humanity and efficiency when the evidence is clear and the parties’ interests (which should always remain the best interests of the incapable person) align.

[1] Salmon v. Reid, 2025 ONSC 6106

[2] Ibid at para 1.

[3] Ibid at para 2.

[4] Ibid at para 2

[5] Ibid at para 3.

[6] Ibid at para 6.

[7] Ibid at paras 7-8.

[8] Ibid at para 9.

[9] Ibid at para 10.

[10] Ibid at para 11.

[11] Ibid at para 12.

[12] Ibid at para 13.

[13] Ibid at para 14.

[14] Ibid at para 15.

[15] Ibid at para 16.

[16] Ibid at para 17.

[17] Ibid at para 18.

[18] Ibid at para 19.

[19] Ibid at para 20.

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