Court Denies Summary Judgement in The Estate of Dr. Paul Morgan v. Lavelle
In The Estate of Dr. Paul Morgan v. Lavelle, 2026 ONSC 2137, the Superior Court of Justice declined to grant summary judgment to an estate seeking to enforce a promissory note, holding that the factual disputes regarding the quantum of the promissory note required a trial.
Background Facts:
In April 2020, Dr. Paul Morgan (the “Deceased”) passed away. The Deceased’s sister, Regina and BMO Trust Company were appointed as the estate trustees of the Deceased’s estate (the “Estate”) pursuant to his Last Will and Testament dated December 1, 2020 (the “Will”). Following the Deceased’s death, documents were found in his home, including a promissory note, an acknowledgement and direction and a third document containing amounts owed to the Deceased by Michael L. (the “Defendant”).[1]
The promissory note was signed by the Defendant and the Deceased, which indicated that the Deceased lent the Defendant $444,200 with monthly instalments of $2,276 from January 1, 2016, to December 1, 2021. All documents but the third document were signed by the Deceased and the Defendant and were witnessed by Donald G. (“Mr. G”), the Deceased’s accountant. [2]
In the Acknowledgement and Direction, the Defendant confirms that the Deceased held an unsecured creditor position concerning the purchase of the property at 3048 County Road 10, Milford (the “Property”), with a principal debt of $440,200.[3]
The Estate brought a motion for summary judgement against the Defendant, seeking repayment of the outstanding amount of $536,294.74 from the promissory note. The Estate further contended that as of December 11, 2015, the Defendant owed $444,200 and that there was proof of only a few payments totalling $50,000 paid by the Defendant. The Defendant admitted to signing the promissory note but disputed owing $444,200 at that time, arguing the figure was an estimate and that the Deceased had recouped most of the funds he had lent to the Defendant. On this basis, the Defendant alleged that that a trial was necessary to determine amounts advanced and repayments made.[4]
On the motion, the Estate relied on Greg W’s affidavit (“Mr. W”), a BMO Trust senior trust officer, who had no personal knowledge of the underlying dealings between the Deceased and the Defendant.[5]
On the other hand, Mr. G, the Deceased’s accountant, filed an affidavit supporting the Defendant. In summary, Mr. G asserted that the Defendant and the Deceased entered a joint venture to run a gallery and business in the Property. Most importantly, Mr. G asserted that the promissory note was prepared using “incomplete information” and the sum was never audited. The court importantly noted that Mr. G was a disinterested witness.[6]
Analysis
The court quoting, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, asserted there will be “no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment”.[7] The court may reach this conclusion if the following is met:
- Allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact;
- Allows 2026 ONSC 2137 (CanLII) 4 the judge to apply the law to the facts; and
- Is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.[8]
The court went on to state that the onus of proof is on the moving party bringing the motion for summary judgment:
[16] The onus of proof is on the moving party. It is only after the moving party has discharged its evidentiary burden of proving there is no genuine issue requiring a trial for its resolution does the burden shift to the responding party to prove that its claim or defence has a real chance of success: Dia v. Calypso Theme Waterpark, 2021 ONCA 273, at paras. 24-25.[9]
The court asserted that summary judgement may be appropriate in a matter regarding a promissory note, however, if credibility can’t be assessed on a written record, then a trial is required.[10]
The court found that Mr. G’s evidence, as a seemingly disinterested witness, cast serious doubt on whether the promissory note accurately reflected the true amount owed by the Defendant. Furthermore, Mr. G’s evidence raised questions about whether a trial judge could accept the Defendant’s account, including repayment, without complete documentation. Accordingly, the court held that a trial is required to determine what, if any, amount is owing. The court determined that the fact‑finding powers available on a summary judgment motion would not yield a fair and just determination of the issues regarding the promissory note.[11]
Concluding Remarks
The Court in The Estate of Dr. Paul Morgan v. Lavelle refused to short circuit a factually complex promissory note dispute where the quantum and even existence of the alleged debt were contested.
—
[1] Ibid at para 1
[2] Ibid at para 4
[3] Ibid at para 6
[4] Ibid at para 11
[5] Ibid at para 12
[6] Ibid at para 25
[7] Ibid at para 15
[8] Ibid at para 15
[9] Ibid at para 16
[10] Ibid at para 22
[11] Ibid at para 31
Written by: Gabriella Banhara
Posted on: April 20, 2026
Categories: Commentary
In The Estate of Dr. Paul Morgan v. Lavelle, 2026 ONSC 2137, the Superior Court of Justice declined to grant summary judgment to an estate seeking to enforce a promissory note, holding that the factual disputes regarding the quantum of the promissory note required a trial.
Background Facts:
In April 2020, Dr. Paul Morgan (the “Deceased”) passed away. The Deceased’s sister, Regina and BMO Trust Company were appointed as the estate trustees of the Deceased’s estate (the “Estate”) pursuant to his Last Will and Testament dated December 1, 2020 (the “Will”). Following the Deceased’s death, documents were found in his home, including a promissory note, an acknowledgement and direction and a third document containing amounts owed to the Deceased by Michael L. (the “Defendant”).[1]
The promissory note was signed by the Defendant and the Deceased, which indicated that the Deceased lent the Defendant $444,200 with monthly instalments of $2,276 from January 1, 2016, to December 1, 2021. All documents but the third document were signed by the Deceased and the Defendant and were witnessed by Donald G. (“Mr. G”), the Deceased’s accountant. [2]
In the Acknowledgement and Direction, the Defendant confirms that the Deceased held an unsecured creditor position concerning the purchase of the property at 3048 County Road 10, Milford (the “Property”), with a principal debt of $440,200.[3]
The Estate brought a motion for summary judgement against the Defendant, seeking repayment of the outstanding amount of $536,294.74 from the promissory note. The Estate further contended that as of December 11, 2015, the Defendant owed $444,200 and that there was proof of only a few payments totalling $50,000 paid by the Defendant. The Defendant admitted to signing the promissory note but disputed owing $444,200 at that time, arguing the figure was an estimate and that the Deceased had recouped most of the funds he had lent to the Defendant. On this basis, the Defendant alleged that that a trial was necessary to determine amounts advanced and repayments made.[4]
On the motion, the Estate relied on Greg W’s affidavit (“Mr. W”), a BMO Trust senior trust officer, who had no personal knowledge of the underlying dealings between the Deceased and the Defendant.[5]
On the other hand, Mr. G, the Deceased’s accountant, filed an affidavit supporting the Defendant. In summary, Mr. G asserted that the Defendant and the Deceased entered a joint venture to run a gallery and business in the Property. Most importantly, Mr. G asserted that the promissory note was prepared using “incomplete information” and the sum was never audited. The court importantly noted that Mr. G was a disinterested witness.[6]
Analysis
The court quoting, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, asserted there will be “no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment”.[7] The court may reach this conclusion if the following is met:
The court went on to state that the onus of proof is on the moving party bringing the motion for summary judgment:
[16] The onus of proof is on the moving party. It is only after the moving party has discharged its evidentiary burden of proving there is no genuine issue requiring a trial for its resolution does the burden shift to the responding party to prove that its claim or defence has a real chance of success: Dia v. Calypso Theme Waterpark, 2021 ONCA 273, at paras. 24-25.[9]
The court asserted that summary judgement may be appropriate in a matter regarding a promissory note, however, if credibility can’t be assessed on a written record, then a trial is required.[10]
The court found that Mr. G’s evidence, as a seemingly disinterested witness, cast serious doubt on whether the promissory note accurately reflected the true amount owed by the Defendant. Furthermore, Mr. G’s evidence raised questions about whether a trial judge could accept the Defendant’s account, including repayment, without complete documentation. Accordingly, the court held that a trial is required to determine what, if any, amount is owing. The court determined that the fact‑finding powers available on a summary judgment motion would not yield a fair and just determination of the issues regarding the promissory note.[11]
Concluding Remarks
The Court in The Estate of Dr. Paul Morgan v. Lavelle refused to short circuit a factually complex promissory note dispute where the quantum and even existence of the alleged debt were contested.
—
[1] Ibid at para 1
[2] Ibid at para 4
[3] Ibid at para 6
[4] Ibid at para 11
[5] Ibid at para 12
[6] Ibid at para 25
[7] Ibid at para 15
[8] Ibid at para 15
[9] Ibid at para 16
[10] Ibid at para 22
[11] Ibid at para 31
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