Introduction

When parents contribute substantial funds to help adult children purchase a home, disputes can arise about whether the money was a gift or whether the parent retains a beneficial interest. In Di Turi v. Di Turi-Seemann[1], 2025 ONSC 5000, Justice Nicholson confronted precisely this issue, applying the doctrine of purchase money resulting trust to resolve a dispute between a mother, her son, and his wife.

Background

In 2021, a M.D (the “Applicant”) sold the home she co-owned with her sister for 32 years and contributed $343,347.64 toward the purchase of a new $860,000 home for herself, her son, D.D. and his wife, M.O. (collectively, the “Respondents”).[2] The Respondents, who were expecting their first child, contributed nothing to the downpayment.[3] The balance was financed by mortgage, and all three shared ongoing household expenses.[4] Title to the home was registered in the Respondents’ names as joint tenants, a choice the Applicant testified was an estate-planning decision.[5]

The relationship deteriorated shortly after the move, leading to a physical altercation and a police summons to the home. The Applicant left the home twice before moving back in with her sister permanently in May 2023. The Applicant continued to contribute to the expenses after she moved out.[6] The property was sold in August 2023 for $945,000, with net proceeds of $380,127.73 held in trust pending resolution of this litigation that soon after commenced.[7]

Issues

The sole question before the Court: who was entitled to the proceeds of sale?

• The Applicant’s position: her downpayment was not a gift. Under the doctrine of purchase money resulting trust, she should recover her contribution first ($343,347.64), with the remainder split three ways.[8]
• The Respondents’ position: The Applicant intended her contribution as a gift and only later changed her mind when conflict arose.[9]

Analysis

The court focused on whether The Respondents could rebut the presumption of a resulting trust. This required them to prove the Applicant’s clear intention to make a gift.

Credibility of the Parties

The parties presented viva voce evidence at court. Justice Nicholson found that while neither party was entirely without inconsistencies, their core accounts were generally credible.

• The Applicant gave conflicting accounts of whether she felt pressured by D.D. and understated her health issues, but she consistently denied intending to gift such a large sum. [10] She emphasized that the funds represented a significant portion of her retirement savings. [11]
• D.D was found to be evasive, particularly in refusing to acknowledge that he and M.O. benefitted financially from the arrangement. [12] The judge also noted their disapproval of his decision to secretly record a phone call with his mother, stating that it “reflected negatively” on D.D. [13]
• M.O. was found to be a credible witness, but she was not directly involved in the key conversations and could not offer direct evidence on the central issue of intent.[14]

Early Discussions: Gift vs. Co-Ownership

The court heard testimony from both sides that, during Christmas 2020, two different plans were discussed[15]:

1. The $20,000 Gift: The Applicant offered to give the Respondents, approximately $20,000 from her TFSA as a gift to assist them financially, with no stipulations on how the money was to be used. This proposal would not have required the Applicant to sell her home. The court found that this was a legitimate offer of a gift, but it was never accepted by the Respondents.[16]
2. The Co-Ownership Plan: After rejecting the first offer, D.D was “very insistent” that the Applicant sell her home and move in with them, with her providing the down payment for a new property.[17] This plan involved the Applicant’s contribution coming from the sale of her long-time family home.

This issue is whether this second option was intended by the Applicant to be a gift.[18]

Application of Legal Principles

The court’s decision was guided by established precedent, including Pecore v. Pecore[19], 2007 SCC 17, and Bradshaw v. Hougassian[20], 2024 ONCA 425.

• Presumption of Resulting Trust: The court confirmed that the presumption of advancement does not apply to independent adult children.[21] The onus was squarely on the Respondents to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Applicant’s contribution was intended as a gift.[22]
• Evidence of Intention: The court found the Applicant’s consistent testimony that she never intended such a substantial gift to be persuasive, especially given her impending retirement and need for financial self-sufficiency.[23] The judge also found that D.D’s testimony on the matter was vague, and he admitted the Applicant never called the down payment a “gift”.[24]
• Right of Survivorship: The court rejected the argument that because the Applicant and D.D. held title as joint tenants, the funds were a gift.[25] The judge determined this was a sensible estate-planning choice to avoid probate fees and ensure D.D., her only son, would inherit the property upon her death, which does not constitute an inter vivos gift.[26]

Findings

The Court held that the Respondents had failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust:

• The Applicant’s down payment was not a gift.[27] She intended to preserve her beneficial interest in the property in proportion to her contribution.
• The fact that she once contemplated a smaller $20,000 gift did not mean her later, much larger contribution into a gift.[28]
• D.D.’s argument that living with her grandson was itself a gift was dismissed as unpersuasive and irrelevant to the Applicant’s financial intent.[29]

Accordingly, the Applicant was awarded the return of her $343,347.64 contribution, with the balance of the sale proceeds to be divided equally among the three parties.[30]

Justice Nicholson also noted that although the Respondents may have spent more in expenses than they recovered, they had benefitted financially by avoiding rent and gaining from shared living costs.[31]

Final Thoughts

Di Turi is a reminder of how quickly familial generosity can unravel into litigation. Courts will guard against retrospective claims of donative intent where the evidence is thin. For parents, this case highlights the need to document intentions clearly when contributing to adult children’s housing. For lawyers, it demonstrates the enduring strength of the presumption of resulting trust: unless an unequivocal gift is proven, equity presumes the contributor retains a beneficial interest.

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[1] Di Turi v. Di Turi-Seemann, 2025 ONSC 5000 [Di Turi].

[2] Ibid at paras 4-5.

[3] Ibid at para 6.

[4] Ibid at para 7.

[5] Ibid at para 8.

[6] Ibid at para 9.

[7] Ibid at para 10.

[8] Ibid at para 12.

[9] Ibid at para 13.

[10] Ibid at para 46.

[11] Ibid at paras 24, 38.

[12] Ibid at para 47.

[13] Ibid at para 36. D.D. tendered a secretly recorded call in which the Applicant said, “that was then, this is now.” The Court rejected this as heated argument with little probative value. Similarly, a brief “thank you” in a text message did not establish donative intent.

[14] Ibid at para 48.

[15] Ibid at para 49.

[16] Ibid at para 22-23.

[17] Ibid at para 23.

[18] Ibid at para 49.

[19] Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17.

[20] Bradshaw v. Hougassian, 2024 ONCA 425.

[21] Di Turi, supra note 1 at para 56.

[22] Ibid at para 60.

[23] Ibid at para 62.

[24] Ibid at para 63.

[25] Ibid at para 67.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid at para 64.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid at para 50.

[30] Ibid at para 77.

[31] Ibid at para 78.

[17] Ibid at para 23.

[18] Ibid at para 49.

[19] Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17.

[20] Bradshaw v. Hougassian, 2024 ONCA 425.

[21] Di Turi, supra note 1 at para 56.

[22] Ibid at para 60.

[23] Ibid at para 62.

[24] Ibid at para 63.

[25] Ibid at para 67.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid at para 64.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid at para 50.

[30] Ibid at para 77.

[31] Ibid at para 78.